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A DECADE  OR SO ago, when the twin concerns  about the balance of pay- 
ments of the United States  and the functioning  of the international  mone- 
tary system  began to impinge  on the consciousness  of a public  theretofore 
indifferent  to such  esoterica,  the opinions  of those who were  already  paying 
attention fell into a neat dichotomy. Government  officials  and "men of 
affairs,"  on the one hand, insisted that the continued  health of interna- 
tional trade,  investment,  and the world  economy  required  the maintenance 
of  the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates, under which 
changes in rates were made infrequently  and as a last resort. Academic 
experts,  on the other hand, were nearly  unanimous  in pressing  the advan- 
tages of greater  flexibility  of exchange  rates, with many urging  that gov- 
ernments  abstain altogether  from intervention  and allow exchange  rates 
to be determined  by the interplay  of supply and demand  in the market- 
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place, just like any other price.' The specter of competitive  depreciation 
left over from the 1930s was replaced  by concern about the rigidity of 
mechanisms  for payments adjustment  under the Bretton Woods system. 
Furthermore,  the postwar  wave of "elasticity  pessimism"  had given  way to 
"elasticity  optimism"  as new empirical  studies,  better specified  and using 
more sophisticated  statistical  techniques  than their  predecessors,  indicated 
that demand  elasticities  were  indeed  high enough  to ensure  exchange-mar- 
ket stability and thus the effectiveness  of exchange-rate  changes as an 
instrument  of balance-of-payments  adj-ustment. 
A number of assumptions,  explicit or implicit, underlay  the economic 
analysis  of payments  adjustment  in the fifties and sixties and the resulting 
implications  for balance-of-payments  policies.  To begin with, although  the 
problem was ostensibly  to restore equilibrium,  or reduce disequilibrium, 
in the balance of payments,  Keynesian  analysis,  with its emphasis  on the 
components of aggregate  demand, focused on the balance of trade  (net 
exports of goods and services), which is one of those components. Net 
exports  were  assumed  to be a function  of aggregate  demand  and of relative 
prices  at home and abroad;  in the face of downward  rigidity  of wages  and 
prices  in the domestic  market,  changes  in the exchange  rate were the most 
effective  means of altering  those relative  prices-hence  the stress on the 
elasticities  of home demand  for imports  and of foreign  demand  for exports. 
Although some analysts explored the effect on the capital account of 
changes  in the relative  profitability  of investing  at home and abroad, the 
main body of analysis assumed  that, whatever  effects particular  policies 
might  have on the other  accounts  in the balance  of payments,  the impact  on 
the goods and services  account would be dominant.2 
One implication  of this approach  is that, in a world of fixed exchange 
rates and Keynesian downward  rigidity in wages and prices, the price- 
1. For two of the best-known academic  briefs for flexible  rates, see Milton Friedman, 
"The Case for Flexible Exchange  Rates," in Richard E. Caves and Harry G. Johnson, 
eds., Readings  in Initernational  Economics  (Irwin, 1968), pp. 413-37, and Egon Sohmen, 
Flexible Exchange Rates, rev. ed. (University of Chicago Press, 1969). These essays 
were first published in 1953 and 1961, respectively. 
2. This is true in particular  of the classic work by J. E. Meade, The Thleory  of Iiter- 
national  Economic  Policy, vol. 1: The Balance of Payments  (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1951). Surveying  the literature  in the late 1960s, Krueger  noted that "there is no 
widely accepted theory incorporating  both current  and capital account items. The most 
thoroughly explored models in payments theory are those which consider only current 
account transactions and a means of payment." Anne 0.  Krueger, "Balance-of-Pay- 
ments Theory,"  Journal  of Economic  Literature,  vol. 7 (March 1969), p. 2. Marina  v. N. Whitman  493 
adjustment  mechanism  will not operate,  at least in the deficit  country,  to 
restore  payments  equilibrium  automatically  and painlessly  after a distur- 
bance;  rather,  the restoration  or maintenance  of such external  equilibrium 
must be an explicit  target  of economic  policy. In the absence  of exchange- 
rate flexibility  to alter relative prices, the most obvious mechanism  for 
eliminating  external  imbalance  is the Keynesian  one: if exports  are a func- 
tion of foreign  income (taken to be exogenously  determined)  and imports 
a function  of domestic  income, then a reduction  of domestic  income will 
lead  to an improvement  in the trade  balance  and thus  in the balance  of pay- 
ments.  Such  a resolution  of external  payments  problems  is, however,  likely 
to be unacceptable  to governments  committed  to full employment  as the 
primary  domestic economic objective.3  And so a vast literature,  incorpo- 
rating  capital  mobility, quickly  arose, directed  toward developing  a com- 
bination  of policy instruments  that would enable governments  to achieve 
simultaneously  the targets of internal  balance  (full employment)  and ex- 
ternal  balance  (payments  equilibrium).4  But the proliferation  of models of 
internal-external  balance  reinforced  rather  than weakened  the conviction 
that governments  would have greater  success in achieving  their domestic 
economic  targets  if they  were  able  either  to use exchange-rate  changes  as an 
additional  policy tool (managed  flexibility)  or to exercise  other policy in- 
struments  free of the balance-of-payments  constraint  imposed by pegged 
exchange  rates  (freely  flexible  rates).  Furthermore,  some  argued,  while,  un- 
der fixed rates,  changes in foreign income and expenditure  would affect 
aggregate  domestic income by altering  the level of exports and thus the 
trade balance, freely flexible rates would insulate the domestic economy 
from foreign demand shifts and ensure that such disturbances  would be 
bottled  up where  they originated,  rather  than spreading  from one country 
to another  via the Keynesian  transmission  belt. 
3. Furthermore,  if the domestic economy is stable in isolation (that is, the marginal 
propensity  to save exceeds zero), the Keynesian income-adjustment  mechanism  will fall 
short of an automatic full restoration of external equilibrium  in the wake of a balance- 
of-payments  disturbance,  as long as the feedback effects of the resulting disequilibrium 
in the money market are either disregarded  or assumed to be neutralized by policy 
actions. 
4. See Marina v. N.  Whitman, Policies for Internal and External Balance, Special 
Papers  in International  Economics 9 (Princeton University, International  Finance Sec- 
tion, 1970)  for a survey of that literature.  One practical  application  in the United States 
was "Operation  Twist" of the early 1960s, which sought to attract capital inflows with 
high short-term  interest rates while keeping long-term rates low to stimulate domestic 
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Today, most major industrialized  countries are no longer bound to 
pegged exchange  rates. But a funny thing happened  on the way to this 
flexible-rate  nirvana.  The post-Bretton  Woods world  of managed  flexibility 
has produced surprises  undreamed  of in the analyses of the 1950s and 
1960s;  moreover,  a small  but influential  group  of international  economists 
has stood traditional balance-of-payments  analysis on its head. I have 
termed this group the "global monetarists"-"monetarists"  because of 
their  belief that macroeconomic  phenomena  can be analyzed  best in terms 
of the relationship  between  the demand  for and the supply  of money, and 
"global" because of their conviction that, as a first approximation,  the 
world consists, not of separable  national economies,  but of a single, inte- 
grated,  closed economy. 
From these two fundamental  tenets arise a number  of startling  propo- 
sitions. Put in their most extreme form, they include the following: A 
change  in the exchange  rate will not systematically  alter  the relative  prices 
of domestic  and foreign  goods and it will have only a transitory  effect on 
the balance of payments.  Any exercise  of monetary  policy to change the 
domestic  component  of the monetary  base will, under  fixed  exchange  rates, 
be offset  by an equal  and opposite  change  in the foreign  component  of that 
base. Thus, exchange-rate  policy cannot permanently  alter the balance of 
payments  and monetary  policy cannot lastingly  affect the domestic  econ- 
omy, but a change in the exchange  rate will have a direct impact on the 
domestic  price level, and monetary  policy will have a direct  effect on the 
country's  payments  position (measured  by the change  in its reserves  under 
a fixed-rate  system, by the movement in its exchange rate under freely 
flexible  rates, and by a combination  of the two under  managed  flexibility). 
Not only are  exchange-rate  changes  ineffective  as an instrument  of balance- 
of-payments  policy for the long run, they are also unnecessary;  indeed, 
there is no need to make external  balance an explicit target of national 
economic  policy, since  an automatic  adjustment  mechanism  can  be counted 
on to restore  such balance  in the wake of an exogenous disturbance  that 
moves a nation's  balance  of payments  temporarily  away  from equilibrium. 
Finally, flexible exchange  rates are not merely superfluous  but positively 
detrimental  to world economic welfare,  because they eliminate  the inter- 
national pooling of risks and the efficiency  advantages  of international 
money associated  with fixed exchange  rates.5 
5. For a popular exposition of these views, see Jude Wanniski,  "The Mundell-Laffer 
Hypothesis-A  New View of the World  Economy,"  Public  Interest,  no. 39 (Spring 1975), Marina  v. N.  Whitman  495 
Far from being new, these  propositions  of the global monetarists  repre- 
sent a return  to a tradition  far older  than the Keynesian  approach  they are 
challenging-to  the price-specie-flow  mechanism  of David Hume, who 
argued  that the international  flows of reserves  engendered  by a payments 
imbalance  would, through their effects on national money supplies and 
price levels and thus on the trade  balance, automatically  restore  external 
balance.6  Nonetheless, these views pose a direct challenge  to the current 
orthodoxy,  and they have revolutionary  implications  for balance-of-pay- 
ments  policy and even for balance-of-payments  accounting. 
The Skeleton  Model: A Tripartite  Structure 
To assess these implications,  and evaluate the relative merits of the 
Keynesian  and the global-monetarist  prescriptions  for contemporary  U.S. 
policy,  requires  first  describing  the analytical  underpinnings  of this new-old 
approach  and ascertaining  where it can, and cannot, be reconciled  with 
current  orthodoxy.7  These tasks, in turn, call for an examination  of the 
various, frequently  intertwined,  intellectual  strands  that together  give the 
pp. 31-52.  The economists referred to  in the title are Robert Mundell and Arthur 
Laffer,  two leading proponents  of global monetarism.  The modern incarnation  of global 
monetarism was developed during the late 1950s and 1960s, primarily  in a series of 
articles by Mundell, many of which are collected or further developed in two books 
by him: International  Economics (Macmillan, 1968) and Monetary Theory: Inflation, 
Interest, and Growth  in the World  Economy  (Goodyear, 1971). Mundell's work in turn 
grew out of some earlier work by Polak: J. J. Polak, "Monetary Analysis of Income 
Formation and Payments Problems," International  Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol. 
6 (November 1957), pp. 1-50, and J. J. Polak and Lorette Boissonneault, "Monetary 
Analysis of Income and Imports and Its Statistical Application," ibid., vol. 7 (April 
1960), pp. 349-415. 
6. See Jacob A. Frenkel, "Adjustment  Mechanisms  and the Monetary Approach to 
the Balance of Payments: A Doctrinal Perspective,"  in E. Classen and P. Salin, eds., 
Recent Issues in International  Monetary  Economics  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland, forth- 
coming, 1976). 
7. To make clear what is meant by "current orthodoxy," I quote from Johnson: 
"The quantity-theory  counter-revolution . . . has been directed against the so-called 
'income-expenditure'  school, by which is meant those economists in the Keynesian 
tradition who have concentrated  their analysis and policy prescriptions  on the income- 
expenditure  side of the Keynesian general-equilibrium  apparatus.  (This focus has been 
the dominant impact of the Keynesian revolution on governmental  and other practical 
thinking on  economic forecasting and policy-making)." Harry G.  Johnson, Further 
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approach  its distinctiveness.  In order  to anchor  the discussion  in a specific 
example, I have borrowed, with minor modifications,  a stripped-down, 
one-commodity,  two-country  model which, while it cannot do justice to 
the richness  and complexity  either  of the relevant  literature  in general.  or of 
its originator's  work  in particular,  serves  as a convenient  aid to exposition-:8 
(1)  L =  kPy 
L* =  k*P*-* 
(2)  P  =  P*e 
(3)  M-D  +  R 
M*  D* +  R* 
(4)  M=R  =  H=  B  =-eH*  =-eR*  =-eM* 
(5)  Z=Py-H 
Z*=  P*y*  -  H* 
(6)  H  = H(L-M)  =H(P,M) 
H*  =  ll(L*  -  M*)  =H*(P*gM*) 
where an asterisk indicates variables for the foreign country and a dot 
indicates  rate of change, and 
L =  desired nominal money balances 
k =  desired  ratio of nominal  money balances  to nominal  income 
=  real output  (taken as exogenous) 
P = money price of goods in terms of domestic  currency 
e =  exchange  rate (domestic  currency  price of foreign  exchange) 
M  =  nominal quantity of money 
D =  domestic component of  the domestic money supply (taken as 
exogenous) 
R = international  component  of the domestic  money supply 
B =  trade-balance  surplus,  measured  in domestic  currency 
Z = desired  nominal  expenditure 
H = flow demand  for money (hoarding  function) 
H = rate of adjustment  of actual to desired  money balances. 
These equations define a simple macroeconomic  general-equilibrium 
model, in contrast  to both the conventional  price-adjustment  (elasticities) 
8. Rudiger Dornbusch, "Devaluation, Money, and Nontraded Goods," American 
Economic  Review, vol. 63 (December 1973), pp. 871-80. Marina  v. N.  Whitman  497 
approach,  which  is clearly  microeconomic  and partial-equilibrium,  and the 
income-adjustment  approach which, although based on the Keynesian 
macroeconomic  model, is not truly a general-equilibrium  view in that it 
ignores  the interactions  between  the goods market  and the money  market.9 
The global monetarists  stress the importance  of these interactions;  more 
generally,  they insist that, when one market  is eliminated  from a general- 
equilibrium  model by Walras'  law, the behavioral  specifications  for the in- 
cluded  markets  must  not be such  as to imply  a specification  for the excluded 
market  that would appear  unreasonable  if it were  made explicit.10 
This model is also characteristic  of the genre  in that it specifies  both the 
equilibrium  characteristics  of the long-run  steady  state, in equations  I and 
2, and the dynamic adjustment  process by which the steady state is ap- 
proached,  in equations  4-6. In contrast  with the "medium  run"  of conven- 
tional Keynesian  analysis,  which defines  equilibrium  in flow terms alone, 
in this approach  full equilibrium  involves  the achievement  of stock as well 
as flow equilibrium  in all markets.  Having thus resolved  one of the incon- 
sistencies  of Keynesian  analysis,  however,  this view retains  and even inten- 
sifies  another,  in that it combines  long-run  full-equilibrium  assumptions  on 
the demand side with the essentially short-run  assumptions  of the sta- 
tionary  state on the output side." 
9.  For an explanation of why these traditional  modes of analysis are fundamentally 
Keynesian, see the section below on reconciliation  of the various approaches. 
10. See Lance Girton and Don Roper, "A Monetary Model of Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rates Applied to the Postwar Canadian Experience,"  American Economic 
Review  (forthcoming,  1976), and Harry  G. Johnson, "The Monetary  Theory of Balance- 
of-Payments  Policies," in Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G. Johnson, eds., The Monetary 
Approach  to the Balance  ofPayments  (London: Allen and Unwin; Toronto: University  of 
Toronto Press, 1976). 
11. The equilibrium  conditions for the stationary  state can be converted  into growth 
terms by recognizing  that, under conditions of growth, money-market  equilibrium  re- 
quires,  not a zero balance  of payments,  but rather  a balance  determined  by the following 
conditions: (a) the rate of inflation must be the same in both countries, and (b) in each 
country the growth of the real money stock must be equal to the increase in demand 
for real money balances occasioned by growth. For the equilibrium  balance of pay- 
ments these conditionis  together imply 
M  M* 
B  =  -  (gp +  gy -  gD)  -  (gD*  -  P-gy*), 
P  P 
wheregi =  (di/dt)/i for all variables.  See Mundell, Monetary  Theory,  chap. 15, and for a 
similar formulation, Harry G. Johnson, "The Monetary Approach to Balance-of-Pay- 
ments Theory," in Frenkel and Johnson, eds., Monetary Approach. AR the long-run 
conclusions of the monetary  approach derived  from the stationary-state  model can thus 
be translated into equilibrium growth terms without altering the qualitative results, 
except that in the latter case it is possible to obtain persistent  flow-equilibrium  deficits 
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Finally, this two-country  model describes  a situation in which, under 
fixed exchange  rates, the world is a closed, integrated  economy, with a 
single  money  stock and price  level, while  each country  is an open economy 
characterized  by major leakages. Such an approach is internationalist, 
stressing  the interactions  among economies in an interdependent  world 
and, by implication,  the futility of attempting  to analyze-or  manage-a 
national  economy in isolation. All this contrasts  strongly  with the tradi- 
tional Keynesian  focus on the national  economy as the fundamental  unit, 
in which "foreign  repercussions"  are second-order  effects that can affect 
the magnitude  but not the direction  of the primary  impact  of disturbances 
or policies on a relatively  "closed"  economic  unit. 
In addition  to reflecting  some of the general  characteristics  of the global- 
monetarist  approach,  these equations make it possible to identify three 
strands  of key assumptions  that  together  distinguish  this approach  from  the 
conventional  Keynesian  one, but that can be evaluated  independently  of 
one another. 
The  first  equation  embodies  the neutrality  assumption  that is the linchpin 
of monetarism,  whether  in the context  of a closed or an open economy.12  In 
making the level of real income exogenous to the system, equation 1 as- 
sumes  a classical  world  in which  real  output  is constant  (at the full-employ- 
ment level)'3  and all prices,  including  wages, are fully flexible.  The one-to- 
one relationship  between  the supply  of money and the aggregate  price  level 
implies  an absence  of money illusion  and the long-run  neutrality  of money 
vis-i-vis real  variables.  The Cambridge  form of equation 1 also assumes  an 
interest-inelastic  or "super-stable"  demand-for-money  function.  This par- 
ticular  formulation  embodies  an additional  implication:  the impotence  of 
fiscal  policy to affect  any aspect of the economy, including  the price  level. 
The open-economy  view that is the second leg of the global-monetarist 
stool is reflected  in equation  2. This  is the assumption  of perfect  commodity 
arbitrage,  which  ensures  that, in the absence  of barriers  to trade,  the "law 
of one price" must hold in integrated  world commodity markets.'4  Al- 
though the assumption  of this law at the microeconomic  level of a single 
12. For the argument  that this proposition is the critical one in distinguishing  mone- 
tarists from nonmonetarists,  see Don Roper, "Two Ingredients of Monetarism in an 
International  Setting," Seminar Paper 46 (Stockholm: Institute for International Eco- 
nomic Studies, April 1975; processed). 
13. Or, alternatively,  at the level of Friedman's  natural rate of unemployment. 
14. The counterpart  of the "law of one price" in single-country  models is the "small 
country"  assumption, under which the domestic price level (and also the domestic rate 
of interest, in models that incorporate a bond market) is assumed to be exogenously 
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good is widely accepted, its elevation to a macroeconomic  level distin- 
guishes global monetarism  from alternative  approaches.  In other words, 
an implicit  assumption  either  of perfect  substitutability,  or of fixed  relative 
commodity  prices, enables the analysis to apply to a single-commodity 
world  (which  immediately  translates  the law into a "law  of one price  level," 
as here) or to a two-commodity  world (where the distinction  is between 
traded and nontraded  goods). Such aggregation  abstracts,  in particular, 
from changes in the relative  prices of exports and imports-that  is, in a 
country's  terms  of trade.  The terms  of trade  are a significant  element  of the 
elasticities  approach  because  the implicit  assumption  it embodies-that the 
domestic-currency  price of home goods is held constant either by per- 
fectly elastic supply or by the government's  stabilization  policies-makes 
it possible  to equate  changes  in the exchange  rate  with  changes  in the barter 
terms  of trade,  or at least to postulate  a systematic  relationship  between  the 
two. The global-monetarist  approach,  in contrast, makes an alternative 
assumption-that the nominal quantity  of money is held constant under 
devaluation  in the short  run-which implies  no such relationship.  The ab- 
sence of such a relationship  justifies the level of commodity  aggregation 
characteristic  of global-monetarist  models and their focus on exchange 
rates to represent  the relative prices of national moneys rather than of 
national  goods. 
The third  leg of global  monetarism,  the automatic  monetary  mechanism 
for payments  adjustment,  often termed "the monetary  approach"  to the 
balance  of payments,'5  itself has two parts. The first is the assertion  that, 
when the central  bank pegs the exchange  rate, the national  money supply 
becomes an endogenous,  rather  than a policy, variable.  This view is re- 
flected  in equation 3, which (ignoring  the base-money  multiplier  for sim- 
plicity) divides the money supply into domestic-credit  and international- 
reserve  components,  and equation 4, which spells out the feedback  from 
the balance  of payments  (a surplus  or deficit  being  definitionally  equivalent 
to a change in the country's  stock of reserves)  onto the national money 
stock.'6  It is in sharp  contrast  with the assumption,  frequently  implicit  in 
15. The incorporation  of this view into the received  wisdom of balance-of-payments 
theory is symbolized by the difference  between the fourth edition of Charles P. Kindle- 
berger's  widely used text, International  Econonics (Irwin, 1968), which makes no men- 
tion of the monetary approach, and the fifth edition (Irwin, 1973), which devotes an 
entire chapter  to it. 
16. Note that equation 4 assumes implicitly that the capital gains (losses) on inter- 
national  reserves,  measured  in domestic  currency,  arising  from devaluation  (revaluation) 
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conventional  Keynesian  analysis,  that the monetary  authorities  sterilize  the 
impact  on the domestic  money supply  of international  reserve  flows  arising 
from payments  imbalance  (and that the effects  of such sterilization  opera- 
tions on the stock of private  wealth  can be ignored). 
Equations  5 and 6 together embody the second part of the automatic 
adjustment  mechanism  of the monetary  approach-the assertion  (a) that 
the relationship  between  the demand  for and the supply of money plays a 
key role in the functioning  of all markets  in the economy; and (b) that the 
demand  for money is fundamentally  a stock demand  characteristic  of asset 
markets  rather than a flow demand appropriate  to output (commodity) 
markets."7  Specificaly,  equation  5 embodies  a form  of "real  balance"  effect 
that makes the desired  level of expenditure  a function  of wealth  as well as 
income.  Here,  this effect  produces  a flow demand  for money  which  is repre- 
sented  in equation  6 as a function  of the difference  between  the desired  and 
actual stocks of money. Thus, although  the underlying  equilibrium  in the 
money market  is a stock equilibrium,  it is not achieved  instantaneously, 
and the flow demand  for money (the hoarding  function)  arises from the 
gradual  adjustment  of actual money balances toward the desired  stock. 
The existence of this partial-adjustment  mechanism in the market for 
money balances  drives a wedge between short-run  and long-run equilib- 
rium, and between  the short-run  impact  and the long-run  stationary-state 
effects  of policy actions and other exogenous  disturbances. 
The very simplicity  and rigidity of this particular  model enable it to 
yield unambiguous  analytical  results  and strong  policy conclusions.  Within 
its confines,  the short-run  effects of a one-shot change in the pegged ex- 
change  rate are clear: by raising  the domestic  price level (equation  2) and 
thus the demand  for money  balances  (equation  1), a devaluation  stimulates 
hoarding  (equation 6) and brings about a clear-cut improvement  in the 
17. This stock definition of equilibrium in asset markets has at least three major 
antecedents in the modern literature of international finance. The first is the "real- 
balance effect" described  in the seminal article on the absorption  approach by Sidney S. 
Alexander, "Effects of a Devaluation on a Trade Balance" (1952); the second is the 
distinction between stock and flow payments disequilibria  made by Harry G. Johnson 
in his 1961 article, "Towards a General Theory of the Balance of Payments." Both of 
these papers are reprinted  in Caves and Johnson, eds., Readings  in International  Eco- 
nomics. Finally, there are the open-economy portfolio-balance  models, whose develop- 
ment began in the mid-1960s; for example, Ronald I. McKinnon and Wallace  E. Oates, 
The Implications  of International  Economic Integration  for  Monetary, Fiscal, and Ex- 
change-Rate  Policy, Studies in International Finance 16 (Princeton University, Inter 
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payments  balance  (without,  it should  be noted, any terms-of-trade  or rela- 
tive-price  effects)  and a redistribution  of the world money supply toward 
the devaluing  country  (equation  4). This is clear in the substitution  from 
equations  1 and 4 into equation  6 to derive  the two equations  for B shown 
(for a situation of initial long-run  equilibrium)  in the accompanying  dia- 
gram. For  the home  country,  M +  (B/il)  =  kPy,  or B  =  II(kPy -  K). 
Thus, (dB/dP) >  0, giving  the equation  for B its positive slope in the dia- 
gram.  For the foreign  country,  similarly, 
B*  =  1*  *  -y  M*) 
But B -  eB*,  so B =  H*(-k*Py*  +  eM*) and (dB/dP)  <  0, giving the 
equation  for -  eB* its negative  slope in the diagram.  Furthermore, 
dB  /  ll*M*  )>0 
-=  llIky  0 
de  llk+  H*k*9*! 
so that devaluation  causes  an upward  shift in -  eB*, producing  a payments 
(trade)  surplus  equal to OS for the home country. 
The effect  on the balance  of payments  is only transitional,  however;  over 
time, as the world money stock is redistributed  and (L -  AM)  approaches 
0, S approaches  0 also, and -  eB* moves gradually  down toward  its origi- 
nal position. In the long run, when full stock equilibrium  is reached  in the 
money  market  (L = M), and hoarding  is therefore  equal to zero, the bal- 
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valuation  has no effect on any real economic variables,  but simply raises 
the aggregate  price level in proportion to the increase in the domestic 
money  stock, which  is the integral  of the payments  surplus  over the transi- 
tional  period  (when  B =  0, P  =  (Mlky)  and  (dP/dM)  =  1).1'  And, finally, 
because  in the long run R =  L -  D, any change  in the domestic  compo- 
nent of the money supply (with the demand for money unchanged)  is 
ultimately  fully offset by an equal opposite change in the international- 
reserve  component  through  the balance of payments. 
Clothing  the Skeleton:  Some Extensions  of the Model 
The model  just described  was deliberately  cut to its bare bones in order 
to reveal  the essential  structure  underlying  global monetarism.  Many ana- 
lysts  have, of course,  built on this skeleton  by eliminating  or severely  modi- 
fying one or more of the three strands  of global-monetarist  assumptions 
while leaving the others intact. Some, for example, replace the classical 
full-employment  assumption  embodied  in equation I with the Keynesian 
assumption  of wage-price  stickiness  and underemployment,  thus making 
real output endogenously  variable  and eliminating  the proportionality  be- 
tween the nominal  money stock and the price level. In so doing, they re- 
place or supplement  the Humean  price-specie-flow  mechanism  that drives 
the model of the previous  section  with what  Mundell  has termed  a Keynes- 
ian income-specie-flow  mechanism.'9  This  introduction  of an elastic  supply 
curve for output eliminates  the neutrality  assumption  central to mone- 
tarism,  but retains  the automatic  monetary  mechanism  of payments  adjust- 
ment that makes payments imbalances  transitory  and inconsistent  with 
stationary-state  equilibrium. 
A second  class of extensions  of this basic  model involves  broadening  the 
spectrum  of financial  assets in the system  to include  bonds or other types 
of interest-bearing  securities  as well as money, thus reinserting  the interest 
rate as an argument  of certain  behavioral  relationships  (for example, in 
equation 1 above) and reintroducing  the portfolio-balance  considerations 
18. It can easily be shown that the division of a devaluation between a rise in the 
home country's price level and a fall in the foreign country's price level is inversely 
proportional to the sizes of the two countries' initial money stocks. See Dornbusch, 
"Devaluation, Money, and Nontraded Goods," p. 874. 
19. Mundell, International  Economics,  p. 218. Marina  v. N. Whitman  503 
pioneered  in the open-economy  context  by McKinnon  and Oates.20  In such 
models, the money-market  stock-equilibrium  condition of equation 1 is 
transformed  into an asset-equilibrium  condition  that  incorporates  all finan- 
cial assets.2'  Such models generally  also introduce  a "budget  constraint" 
equation  for the government  sector,  which  acts as supplier  of bonds to the 
private  sector.  This  provision  marks  a contrast  with  the basic  model  utilized 
here  which, although  it may be used to analyze  the impact of such policy- 
induced  shocks  as a devaluation  or a one-shot  change  in the domestic  com- 
ponent of the money supply, is essentiaUy  a model of the private sector. 
This extension  of the model, furthermore,  admits  the existence  of interna- 
tional capital  flows and thus a distinction  between  the balance  of trade  and 
the balance  of payments. 
Relaxing  the second strand  of global monetarism,  which I have termed 
the "law of one price level" and which is reflected  in equation 2 above, 
means  moving  away  from  the high degree  of aggregation  employed  in such 
a one-commodity  model.  Assuming  the existence  of nontraded  goods, or of 
less-than-perfect  substitutability  between domestic and foreign goods (or 
assets), allows for the possibility of shifts in relative prices and restores 
some degree  of independence  to the domestic  interest  rate and price  level.22 
These  extensions  and  refinements  naturally  introduce  considerable  ambi- 
guity into the analytical  conclusions  that can be derived  and qualify  in one 
way or another  the strong  policy  implications  of the pure  global-monetarist 
model. In models allowing  for shifts in relative  prices between  home and 
foreign  or between  traded  and nontraded  goods, for example,  the short-run 
impact of a devaluation  is no longer "neutral";  the alteration  of relative 
20. "Implications  of International  Economic Integration."  Among more recent  port- 
folio-balance models for an open economy are William H. Branson, "Macroeconomic 
Equilibrium  with Portfolio Balance  in Open Economies,"  Seminar  Paper  22 (Stockholm: 
Institute for International Economic Studies, November 1972; processed); Rudiger 
Dornbusch, "A Portfolio Balance Model of the Open Economy," Journal  of Monetary 
Economics,  vol. 1 (January  1975), pp. 3-20; Jacob A. Frenkel and Carlos A. Rodriguez, 
"Portfolio  Equilibrium  and the Balance  of Payments:  A Monetary  Approach,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol. 65 (September  1975), pp. 674-88. 
21. The use of money balances rather than the total stock of financial assets as an 
argument of the expenditure  function not only attributes special importance to money 
but also implicitly assumes a low (in the limit, zero) elasticity of substitution between 
money and other assets. 
22. For example, Branson, "Macroeconomic Equilibrium  with Portfolio Balance"; 
Rudiger Dornbusch, "Capital Mobility and Portfolio Balance," in Robert Z. Aliber, 
ed., The Political Economy of Monetary Reform (London: Macmillan, forthcoming); 
and the second part of Dornbusch's "Devaluation, Money, and Nontraded Goods." 504  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
prices affects  real variables  over the period of transition  to a new stock 
equilibrium.  More generally,  in these more complicated  models,  the initial 
effect of various exogenous disturbances  and the characteristics  of the 
dynamic  adjustment  path toward  long-run  stock equilibrium  are extremely 
sensitive  to assumptions  about  the way in which  expectations  are formed,23 
which  markets  clear  instantaneously  and which  approach  equilibrium  grad- 
ually, whether  prices or quantities  perform  the clearing  function, and the 
nature  of the adjustment  mechanism  in markets  that clear  only with a lag.24 
Despite the ambiguity  produced  by various modifications  of the basic 
global-monetarist  model, its long-run  stationary-state  implications  neces- 
sarily  remain  robust  to a wide variety  of alternative  specifications  as long 
as the third strand of global monetarism,  the monetary  approach  to the 
balance  of payments,  is retained.  The essentials  of the monetary  approach, 
it will be recalled, are (1) the nonsterilization  assumption,  which links 
changes in the domestic  money supply to disequilibria  in the balance of 
payments  as indicated  in equations  3 and 4; and (2) the associated  implica- 
tion that the equilibrium  values  in the income-expenditure  equation  will be 
changing  as long as the nominal quantity of money, M, is changing  (as 
indicated  by the dynamic  adjustment  process  specified  in equations  5 and 
6), and that they cannot come to rest until the system is in full stock 
equilibrium. 
The adjustment  mechanism  that characterizes  the monetary  approach  to 
the balance of payments  does not, however,  require  the incorporation  of 
money directly into the expenditure  function. In a model with interest- 
bearing assets, disequilibrium  in the money market will feed back onto 
other markets,  even if money is not an argument  of the expenditure  func- 
tion, by causing changes in the rate of interest,  which is traditionally  an 
argument  of both the expenditure  and the money-demand  functions.  To 
put it in the familiar  terminology  of macroeconomics  textbooks, shifts in 
the supply of or demand for money can affect aggregate  demand  either 
23. Gordon argues that the nature of expectations formation, as well as the degree 
of short-run price flexibility, determines  whether domestic stabilization policies can be 
effective in the short run. Robert J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in the Theory of 
Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economics (forthcoming, April 
1976). 
24. For a detailed analysis of the differing  implications of two specifications of the 
adjustment  process in an otherwise  identical model, see Polly Reynolds Allen and Peter 
B. Kenen, "Portfolio Adjustment in Open Economies: A Comparison of Alternative 
Specifications," Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv  (forthcoming, March 1976). Marina  v. N.  Whitman  505 
directly,  by shifting  the IS curve, or indirectly,  by shifting  the LM curve 
and thus the rate of interest.  Therefore,  unless  the economy is assumed  to 
be in a situation  in which  changes  in the stock of money  have no impact  on 
income (either a  Keynesian liquidity or marginal-efficiency  trap), the 
automatic  payments-adjustment  mechanism,  which is the linchpin of the 
monetary  approach  to the balance  of payments,  will still operate,  whether 
the link between  the money  market  and expenditures  is direct  or indirect.25 
In sum, the kind of global-monetarist  model that yields the policy impli- 
cations outlined in the opening section of this paper involves much more 
than simply the monetary approach to the balance of payments.26  The 
latter  is "monetary"  in the sense  that it postulates  a direct  relationship  be- 
tween  the balance  of payments  and the money supply  and requires  that the 
equation  for stock  equilibrium  in the money  market  be included  in the solu- 
tion set for a model of an open economy.  The strict  global-monetarist  view 
goes much further,  however,  implying  either  that monetary  disturbances  to 
the economy generally  dominate  nonmonetary  ones or that the impact of 
any exogenous  shock, whatever  its nature  and origin,  can best be analyzed 
via the relationship  between  the demand  for and the supply of money. 
The Various  Approaches:  A Formal  Reconciliation 
One way of exposing the analytical  differences  among the various ap- 
proaches  to balance-of-payments  analysis  is to make explicit  the nature  of 
the assumptions  required  to make them formally  consistent  with one an- 
other. Mundell outlines  the framework  for such a reconciliation  by char- 
acterizing  three approaches  to balance-of-payments  analysis (at first ab- 
stracting,  for simplicity's  sake,  from  capital  movements,  so that the balance 
of trade and the balance of payments are identical; all aggregates  are in 
nominal  terms): 
25. See  Mundell, International  Economics, chap.  15, and  Carlos A.  Rodriguez, 
"Money and Wealth in an Open Economy Income-Expenditure  Model," in Frenkel 
and Johnson, eds., Monetary  Approach. 
26. The two are often confused. In a strongly worded protest, Harry Johnson com- 
plains  that "there  has been a noticeable  tendency  to dismiss  the new [monetary]  approach 
as merely  an international  economics application of an eccentric and intellectually  ludi- 
crous point of view of a contemporary  lunatic fringe  referred  to as 'monetarism.'  " "The 
Monetary Approach to  Balance-of-Payments Theory: A  Diagrammatic Analysis," 
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1. The elasticity  approach  takes  the balance-of-payments  equation,  B = 
X -  M (where X and M are exports and imports,  respectively),  directly, 
differentiates  it totally with respect to the exchange rate, translates  the 
results  into elasticities  form,  and thus  establishes  the "elasticity  conditions" 
showing the effects of a change in the exchange rate on the balance of 
trade, "assuming  that export and import prices adjust to equate the de- 
mand and supply of exports  and imports." 
2. The absorption approach takes, from national-income  accounting, 
the relationship B =  Y -  E (where Y is nominal income and E is domestic 
expenditure  or absorption)  and points out that a policy change,  such as a 
devaluation,  can improve  the balance  of trade  only if it increases  income  by 
more than expenditures. 
3. The monetary  approach  stresses  that the balance  of payments  implies 
a change  in the foreign-reserve  holdings of the central  bank, and that this 
change  must equal  the difference  between  the total increase  in the domestic 
money  supply  and domestic  credit creation;  that is, B =  H  -  C (where 
H is hoarding  or additional  money stocks and C is domestic  credit crea- 
tion). The introduction  of capital movements  makes no difference  to the 
validity of this approach.27 
Mundell  points out that the terms  in each of the three approaches  "can 
be defined  so that  they are  all correct  and assert  identical  propositions,  even 
if capital  movements  are included."  Taking  all variables  as ex post identi- 
ties, he notes that "from  national  income  accounting  we have Y  =  E +  B; 
from  banking  accounts  we have H-  C +  R [R is the increase  in reserves]; 
and from the balance-of-payments accounts we have R =  B -  T, where T 
represents net capital exports.  It follows,  then,  that R -  B -  T  Y - 
E-  T-H-  C."28 
A simple equality among ex post or accounting  identities is not very 
meaningful,  however,  and one must look behind  these identities  to see just 
how the variables  are  defined,  and what  implicit  assumptions  underlie  these 
definitions,  in order to produce the reconciliation  just outlined. Further- 
more, the discussion  is complicated  because  most of the comparisons  here 
have been cast in terms  of the monetary  approach  on the one hand and the 
conventional  or Keynesian  approach  on the other, and there are several 
significantly  different  variants  of the latter  despite  the fundamental  Keynes- 
ian spirit  common to all of them. 
The elasticities approach to  balance-of-payments  analysis is  clearly 
27. International  Economics,  pp. 150-51. The quote in point 1 is on p. 150. 
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Keynesian  in the sense that only under Keynesian  assumptions  of unem- 
ployment  and wage-price  rigidity  in domestic  markets  can it be assumed 
that "a devaluation  would  change  the real  prices  of domestic  goods relative 
to foreign  goods in the foreign and domestic  markets,  thereby  promoting 
substitutions  in production and consumption,"  and that "any repercus- 
sions of these substitutions  on the demand  for domestic  output could be 
assumed  to be met by variations  in output and employment."29  However, 
these Keynesian  assumptions  alone are not sufficient  to define  the general- 
equilibrium  implications  of the partial-equilibrium  elasticities  approach.  In 
particular,  when the formal model underlying  the elasticity  conditions is 
spelled out, it generally  makes  the volume  of exports and of imports (or, 
more precisely,  foreign  excess demand  for export goods and domestic  ex- 
cess demand for import goods, respectively)  each a function of its own 
money  price,  rather  than of their  relative  prices  and total real  income  (as in 
the barter  model of pure trade theory) or of relative  prices  and the differ- 
ence between  actual  and desired  money stocks (as in a full general-equilib- 
rium model). It turns out that the functional  relationships  implicit  in the 
elasticities  approach  can be reconciled  with those of general-equilibrium 
analysis, and thus with the monetary approach,  under the following as- 
sumptions:  (1) in each country there is a nontraded  commodity;  (2) this 
commodity  dominates  the budgets of consumers;  (3) the objective  of sta- 
bilization  policy (monetary  or fiscal)  in each country  is to keep the money 
price of the nontraded  good fixed; and (4) all cross-price  elasticities  be- 
tween traded  goods are zero.30 
The reconciliation  of the monetary approach with the absorption  ap- 
proach  is considerably  less complicated,  since "the monetary  approach  in 
its simplest  form . . . can be considered  as a pure absorption  approach,  in 
which the demand  for money relative  to its initial supply determines  ab- 
sorption [relative  to income]."'"  Indeed, the father  of the modern  absorp- 
tion approach  himself noted that "the cash balance effect is perhaps  the 
29. "Monetary Approach to  Balance-of-Payments Theory."  Note,  incidentally, 
that it is not strictly necessary for relative prices of  domestic and foreign goods to 
change in order to induce substitutions in production if the relative costs of factors of 
production  change. Such changes are also ruled out by the usual Keynesian  assumptions. 
30. Murray C. Kemp, Thze  Pure Theory  of International  Trade  (Prentice-Hall,  1964), 
pp. 235-36, and Rudiger Dornbusch, "Exchange Rates and Fiscal Policy in a Popular 
Model of International  Trade," American  Economic  Review, vol. 65 (December 1975), 
pp. 859-71. 
31. Patrick Minford, "Substitution Effects, Speculation, and Exchange Rate Sta- 
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best known of the direct  absorption  effects."32  One difference  between  the 
two approaches  is that the monetary  view focuses  on the real-balance  effect 
exclusively.  A second is that the absorption  approach  incorporates  by im- 
plication  markets  for commodities  and money only, so that the difference 
between  aggregate  income and aggregate  expenditure  equals the balance 
of trade.  The monetary  approach,  on the other  hand,  sometimes  introduces 
a market for bonds, allowing disequilibrium  in the money market to be 
reflected  not only in the commodities  market (and thus the balance of 
trade), but also in the market for bonds (and thus the capital account); 
hence,  such a disequilibrium  is reflected  in the overall  balance  of payments 
(the trade account  plus the capital  account).33 
It remains  to note that the absorption  approach  is a variant-or,  more 
accurately,  a generalization-of Keynesian  multiplier  analysis.  Both stem 
from the basic national-income accounting identity, Y =  C +  I +  X  -  M 
(omitting  the government  sector, G -  T, for the sake of simplicity),  where 
C is consumption  and I is investment.  Setting  C +  I  =  E (expenditure  or 
absorption)  yields  Y -  E  =  X  -  M  =  B, the starting point  for the ab- 
sorption approach.  The usual (linearized)  multiplier  analysis is a special 
case of the absorption  approach  in that it assumes  (1) that changes  in im- 
ports are a constant proportion, m, of changes in income; (2) that all 
changes in aggregate  demand  are met by changes in output at constant 
prices  (either  because  supply is infinitely  elastic below full employment  or 
as a result of deliberate government policy34); and (3) that changes in saving 
are also a constant  fraction,  s, of changes  in income.  Taken  together,  these 
assumptions  ensure,  first, that a policy action-such  as devaluation-de- 
signed  to increase  B will operate  by increasing  real output, Y; and, second, 
that multiplier  effects  on income  will operate  to reduce  the impact  effect  of 
a devaluation  on the balance  of payments  but will never, given a positive 
marginal  propensity  to save, eliminate  or reverse  it.35 
32. Alexander, "Effects of a Devaluation," p. 367. 
33. Salop shows, in an ex post accounting framework, how one approach can be 
derived from the other, using Walras' law, introducing the market for bonds, and 
utilizing the budget constraints faced by the various sectors in the economy. Joanne 
Salop, "A Note on the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments," in Peter B. 
Clark, Dennis Logue, and Richard J. Sweeney, eds., The Effects of Exchange Rate 
Adjustment  (U.S. Department of the Treasury,  forthcoming, 1976). 
34. The latter assumption is made by Meade in Theory of International  Economic 
Policy. Note that this approach also implies that the country is specialized in the pro- 
duction of its export good. 
35. It is possible also to combine the elasticity and multiplier  approaches,  taking the 
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Although the traditional  Keynesian  multiplier  analysis  takes a macro- 
economic approach,  as opposed to the basically  microeconomic  view of 
the elasticities  approach,  it implicitly  assumes  that the central  bank pre- 
vents the continuous change in money balances implied by a persistent 
surplus  or deficit  in the balance of payments  from feeding  back onto the 
economy.36  However,  Prais  has shown that the effects  of changing  money 
balances  can be incorporated  simply  into the rigid-price  multiplier  frame- 
work, yielding  an automatic  income-adjustment  mechanism  for the elimi- 
nation  of a payments  imbalance  instead  of the price-adjustment  mechanism 
typically  employed in monetary-approach  models.37  The results differ, of 
course,  from those of full global monetarism:  under  its assumptions  equi- 
librium  will always  be reached  at the full-employment  level, but the income- 
expenditure  equilibrium  and external  balance achieved  in the multiplier- 
plus-money  approach  would only accidentally  be at full employment. 
A number  of authors  who use the general-equilibrium  monetary  view to 
analyze policies affecting  the balance of payments have expressed  their 
models in a way that reveals the essential complementarity  of the three 
approaches.  As already  noted, the monetary  approach  can be character- 
ized as a kind of absorption  approach  in which  the relation  between  desired 
and actual money stocks determines  absorption  relative to income. If a 
monetary  model of the sort described  earlier  is expanded  to incorporate 
two goods, and thus relative  prices,  it will, of course,  reveal  that the effects 
of monetary-induced  changes  in absorption  on relative  prices  (and thus on 
which in turn generate multiplier  effects. See, for example, Meade, chap. 15, and John- 
son, "Monetary Theory of Balance-of-Payments  Policies." 
36. This is not true of J. E. Meade, who included the money supply as well as the 
interest  rate in his model. He then, however, assumed that monetary policy was either 
"Keynesian neutral"  (maintained  a constant rate of interest) or such as to ensure "in- 
ternal balance." Either of these assumptions makes the money supply adapt passively 
to changes in the demand for it or to the policy requirements  of internal balance, thus 
eliminating the influence of the money supply and the interest rate on the effect of a 
devaluation. See S. C. Tsiang, "The Role of Money in Trade-Balance  Stability: Syn- 
thesis of  the Elasticity and Absorption Approaches," in Caves and Johnson, eds., 
Readings  in International  Economics,  pp. 391-92. 
37. S. J. Prais, "Some Mathematical  Notes on the Quantity  Theory of Money in an 
Open Economy," International  Monetary Fund Staff Papers, vol.  8 (May 1961), pp. 
212-26. A similar incorporation of monetary effects into the elasticities approach, via 
a simple arithmetic  example, is given in Arnold Collery, International  Adjustment,  Open 
Economies,  and the Quantity  Theory  of Money, Princeton Studies in International Fi- 
nance 28 (Princeton University, International  Finance Section, 1971), pp. 22-24. 510  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
the amount of reallocation  required)  depend on the magnitudes  of the 
relevant  elasticities.38 
Many of the recent  analytical  refinements  have emerged  from this spell- 
ing out of the assumptions  underlying  alternative  approaches,  stimulated 
by the global-monetarist  challenge  and the responses  to it. These improve- 
ments  include  the recognition  that the partial-equilibrium  assumptions  un- 
derlying  microeconomic  analysis are inadequate  to such fundamentally 
macroeconomic  problems  as devaluation-that, specifically,  it is essential 
to make explicit  the behavioral  assumptions  for all markets  in a macroeco- 
nomic system,  including  the one eliminated  from  the solution  set by Walras' 
law. They include, too, the now obvious but long-ignored  point that ex- 
change rates represent  the relative prices of national moneys,  which will 
correspond  to the relative  prices of national  goods, or the terms of trade, 
only under very special assumptions.  Since money is a financial  asset, it 
follows logically that exchange rates should be determined  (partly or 
wholly) in asset markets  rather  than entirely  in product  markets.  Finally, 
there has emerged  a new sensitivity  to distinguishing  between  the impact 
and long-run  effects  of particular  disturbances,  and to the importance  that 
different  specifications  of the adjustment  mechanism  in particular  markets 
may have in determining  impact  effects  and the dynamic  adjustment  path 
to stationary-state  equilibrium.  Today these  insights  are so widely  accepted 
as to be considered  obvious,  and they are incorporated  into virtually  every 
model analyzing  the balance of payments,  the exchange  rate, or, indeed, 
the impact  of a wide variety  of policies  in an open economy.  As a result,  it 
is frequently  difficult  to draw  the line-to  tell where  the "soft  monetarists" 
leave off and the "eclectic  Keynesians"  begin.39 
DIFFERING  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  POLICY 
This blurring  of distinctions  and reconciliation  of alternative  approaches 
have taken  place,  however,  at the level of formal  models  published  in schol- 
38. See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Alternative  Price Stabilization Rules and the Effects 
of Exchange Rate Changes," Manchester  School, vol. 43 (September  1975), pp. 275-92, 
and Alexander  K. Swoboda, "Monetary Approaches to the Transmission  and Genera- 
tion of Worldwide  Inflation" (paper presented  at the Brookings Conference on World- 
wide Inflation, Washington, D.C., November 1974; processed). 
39. The terminology is from Alan S. Blinder and Robert M. Solow, "Analytical 
Foundations of Fiscal Policy," in Blinder and others, Thle  Economics  of Public Finance 
(Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 58. Marina v. N. Whitman  511 
arly  journals  and read  by a small  group  of specialists.  At the level of policy- 
making, and of public discussion conducted in the daily, weekly, and 
monthly  media  of news  and  opinion,  the implications  of global  monetarism 
and of conventional  Keynesian  analysis  are widely disparate.  As a result 
of distillation  and simplification,  the nonspecialist  sees the global-mone- 
tarist focus on long-run  effects,  on equilibrium  analysis,  on the stabilizing 
forces inherent  in private-market  behavior,  and on price stability  as cru- 
cially different  in substance  and policy implications,  rather  than merely  in 
emphasis,  from  the Keynesian  stress  on the short and medium  run, on dis- 
equilibrium  analysis,  on active government  stabilization  policy, and on full 
employment. 
As was noted at the beginning  of this paper, perhaps  the most startling 
implication  of global  monetarism  is its direct  challenge  to the conventional 
view that  monetary  policy is (along  with  fiscal  policy) a primary  instrument 
for stabilizing  the aggregate  level of domestic  economic  activity,  while the 
exchange  rate is the major  policy tool available  for altering  the balance  of 
payments. In the eyes of the global monetarists,  the endogeneity  of the 
money supply  in an open economy  and the requirement  for money-market 
equilibrium  in stock rather  than flow terms  together  imply  that the pursuit 
of domestic objectives  by altering  the domestic  component  of the money 
supply will be frustrated  by an offsetting  change  in the international  com- 
ponent through reserve  flows. Further, a shift in the exchange  rate can 
affect  the balance  of payments  only to the extent  that it alters  the demand 
for money relative to the supply, and at that only transitorily,  over the 
period required  for the restoration  of money-market  equilibrium.  If one 
adds a third assumption-that  perfect arbitrage  exists across national 
boundaries  in both commodity and capital markets-the  processes  just 
described  will operate  promptly,  rather  than over a relatively  long term, 
thus depriving  monetary  policy of the ability to affect  the domestic  econ- 
omy even in the short run. 
In arguing  that exchange-rate  changes  are both ineffective  and unneces- 
sary  for the achievement  of payments  equilibrium,  global  monetarism  turns 
its back on the father  of modern  monetarism,  Milton Friedman,  who was 
probably  the earliest,  best-known,  and most persistent  supporter  of flexible 
exchange  rates in the postwar  period.  The question  at issue is whether  the 
domestic  money supply  is best regarded  under  pegged  rates as an endoge- 
nous or exogenous  (policy) variable.  Viewing  the money supply  as a vari- 
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pegged rates, Friedman  supports exchange-rate  flexibility  as a means of 
eliminating  payments  imbalances  that would  otherwise  arise  from  divergent 
national monetary  policies (or random real disturbances)  without inter- 
fering with freedom of international  transactions  and thus global effi- 
ciency.40  The global monetarists,  however,  argue  that the requirements  for 
money-market  equilibrium  ensure the elimination of payments disequi- 
librium  even under fixed exchange  rates, and that such a regime  is to be 
preferred  on welfare  grounds  because  it makes international  risk-pooling 
possible  and bestows  the efficiency  advantages  associated  with  the existence 
of international  money.4' 
Retaining  the fundamental  tenets of the monetary  approach  (the non- 
sterilization  assumption  and the requirement  of long-run  stock equilibrium 
in the money market),  but relaxing  the assumptions  of global monetarism 
by (a) permitting  monetary  changes  to affect  real  variables  in the short  run 
and (b) assuming  imperfect  substitutability  across national boundaries  in 
either  product or capital  markets,42  restores  some short-run  independence 
for domestic  policy even under  fixed  exchange  rates.  But the long-run  equi- 
librium  results  are  the same:  the assumptions  of the monetary  approach  are 
sufficient  to ensure the eventual restoration of proportionality  between 
changes  in the money stock and in the price  level, and the worldwide  con- 
vergence  of national  inflation  rates.43 
Under  the assumptions  of the monetary  approach,  devaluation  obviously 
cannot  be used  to bring  about  a permanent  alteration  in a country's  balance 
40. Friedman, "Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," p. 414. 
41. Arthur B. Laffer, ,'Two Arguments for Fixed Rates," and Robert A. Mundell, 
"Uncommon Arguments  for Common Currencies,"  in Harry  G. Johnson and Alexander 
K. Swoboda, eds., The Econiomics  of Common  Currencies  (Oxford: Allen and Unwin, 
1973). Note  that the risk-pooling argument is valid only "if it can be assumed that 
monetary policy errors and output variations are truly random and independent  of the 
exchange rate regime chosen." Johnson, "Monetary Approach .  .  . A Diagrammatic 
Analysis," p. 229. 
42. An alternative  assumption  would be the existence of nontraded  goods and assets. 
See Rudiger Dornbusch, "Real and Monetary Aspects of the Effects of Exchange Rate 
Changes," in Robert Z. Aliber, ed., Nationial  Monetary  Policies and the International 
Finiancial  System (University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
43. Branson points out that this convergence is also implied by a Keynesian trade- 
multiplier  model that incorporates  a price Phillips curve. William H. Branson, "Mone- 
tarist and Keynesian Models of the Transmission of Inflation," American Economic 
Review, vol. 65 (May 1975), pp. 115-19. Gordon notes, however, that the monetary 
approach  adds new channels for international  transmission  of inflation  to the traditional 
ones. Robert J. Gordon,  'Recent Developments," p. 39. Marina  v. N. Whitman  513 
of payments.  Unless all markets are assumed to adjust instantaneously, 
however,  devaluation  will cause  a temporary  improvement  in the payments 
balance  during  the period of transition  to the new equilibrium,  and may 
thus retain  its usefulness  as a policy tool under  certain  circumstances.  Spe- 
cifically,  it may be used either  to achieve  a one-shot  increase  in a country's 
stock of international  reserves,  or to finance a temporary  budget deficit 
through  money creation,  without  causing  a temporary  deterioration  in the 
balance  of payments.44  Similarly,  revaluation  may be used to cause a tem- 
porary  deterioration  in a country's  payments  balance  (and thus a decrease 
in its reserve  stock) and a one-time  reduction  in its price level relative  to 
that in the rest of the world. 
Furthermore,  whereas  the monetary approach generally  considers  the 
effects  of a devaluation  on an economy  that is initially  in long-run  equilib- 
rium,  exchange-rate  changes  are in fact generally  undertaken  from a posi- 
tion of short-run  disequilibrium.  In this context, an exchange-rate  change 
may be  justified  as a faster  way to eliminate  disequilibrium  than  reliance  on 
the monetary  adjustment  mechanism  under  fixed  rates.  The question  arises, 
however,  as to how a payments  disequilibrium  can occur  in the first  place; 
Johnson  notes that "an  appropriate  rationale  for introducing  exchange-rate 
changes  can be introduced  by positing  limitations  on the scope for use of 
ordinary  monetary  policy." He adds, however,  "that  if the initial  deficit  or 
surplus  that prompted  the devaluation  or revaluation  under  consideration 
was due to the inability  of the monetary  authority  to pursue  respectively  a 
sufficiently  contractionary  or sufficiently  expansionary  monetary  policy, the 
exchange  rate change can only lead back transitorily  to balance-of-pay- 
ments equilibrium,  and the deficit or surplus will recur  (and be chronic) 
unless  the relevant  weakness  of the power of conventional  monetary  policy 
is corrected."45 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR ACCOUNTING 
The monetary  approach  to balance-of-payments  analysis  has unconven- 
tional implications  also for the form and structure  of balance-of-payments 
accounting-in particular,  for the type of "balances"  that have analytical 
significance.  As has already  been mentioned,  the Keynesian  approach  fo- 
44. Dornbusch refers to this as the "capital levy aspect of a devaluation."  See "Real 
and Monetary Aspects," p. 75. 
45. "Monetary Approach ...  A Diagrammatic  Analysis," pp. 226-27. 514  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:197S 
cuses  on the balance  on goods and services,  which  corresponds  to the "net 
exports"  sector  in the national  income accounts.  When  the Keynesian  ap- 
proach is expanded  to incorporate  a flow theory of international  capital 
movements,  the corresponding  accounting  framework  would logically in- 
clude  a balance  on goods and services  (the remaining  item in the balance  on 
current  account, unilateral  transfers,  is something  of an anomaly, which 
does not fit easily into any sectoral analytical  framework),  a balance on 
securities  (the "capital  account"),  and a residual  and offsetting  reserve  bal- 
ance which includes the means of payment to finance the other two ac- 
counts.  The optimal  division  among  different  balances  can be debated  end- 
lessly,  and  the balances  themselves  endlessly  proliferated,  but  the underlying 
principle  is the same: there is a net balance  that corresponds  logically to 
each category of transactions  for which there is a separate  explanatory 
theory,  and  transactions  that do not fall into any of the explained  categories 
belong "below  the line," as accommodating  items  that finance  the others.46 
Thus, Keynesians  analyze  the balance  of payments  from the "top down." 
The monetary approach,  in contrast, focuses primarily  on the money 
market  and regards  the relationship  between  the (stock) demand  for and 
supply  of money  as the critical  determinant  of the balance  of payments.  The 
appropriate  analysis  is thus from the "bottom  up," focusing  on changes  in 
the balance  on official-reserve  transactions  and frequently  ignoring  changes 
in the composition of the balance of payments among the nonmonetary 
items above the line. Specifically,  whether  a disequilibrium  in the money 
market  is eliminated  through  the current  or the capital  account  is generally 
indeterminate,47  so that such subbalances  are not of major analytical  sig- 
nificance.  But international  flows of reserves,  far from being a mere resi- 
dual, reflect  the very disequilibrium  in the money market  that moves the 
whole system,  since "it is primarily  through  their  effects  on the money sup- 
ply that [international]  transactions  have any appreciable  impact  on aggre- 
gate economic activity."48  In fact, any disturbance  in international  trans- 
46.  For an outstanding example of this approach to balance-of-payments  analysis 
and forecasting,  see Walter  S. Salant and others, The United  States Balance of Payments 
in 1968 (Brookings Institution, 1963). 
47. For a "monetary approach" model that makes explicit the separate impact of 
disturbances on  the current and the capital accounts, see Frenkel and Rodriguez, 
"Portfolio Equilibrium." 
48. Donald  S.  Kemp,  "Balance-of-Payments Concepts-What  Do  They  Really 
Mean?" Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review,  vol. 57 (July 1975), p. 21. Marina  v. N. Whitman  515 
actions that does not cause disequilibrium  in the monetary  account  is not, 
in this view, a source  of payments  imbalance  at all, since it must have been 
offset either by independent and coincidental changes or by induced 
changes  elsewhere  in the accounts.49 
In a gold-standard  world, without any reserve currencies,  the balance 
that measures  international  flows of reserves,  and hence the effect  of inter- 
national  transactions  on the domestic  money supply, would correspond  to 
the balance on official-reserve  transactions,  as measured  in the U.S. bal- 
ance-of-payments  statistics.  This would then be the crucial-indeed, the 
only  meaningful-balance for the monetary  approach,  since  it would  repre- 
sent  both the pressures  on the dollar  from disequilibrium  in the distribution 
of the world's  money  supply  and the operation  of the automatic  adjustment 
mechanism  to restore worldwide  equilibrium  in the money market. In a 
world of reserve  currencies,  however,  a country  such as the United States 
may, by making  additional  reserves  available,  affect  the money supplies  of 
other countries, without a corresponding  impact on its own. Thus, the 
balance on official-reserve  transactions  of the United States includes not 
only transactions  that alter  some components  of the monetary  base (that  is, 
changes  in U.S. official  holdings  of gold and foreign  currencies  or in foreign 
deposits  at Federal  Reserve  Banks),  but also a variety of transactions  that 
have no such impact  (such  as changes  in holdings  of special  drawing  rights, 
in the U.S. net position  with the International  Monetary  Fund, or in hold- 
ings of U.S. interest-bearing  assets by toreign official agencies).  Yet the 
"balance  on money account,"  or transactions  affecting  the monetary  base, 
which the monetary  approach  regards  as the only appropriate  measure  of 
net exchange  pressure  on a reserve  currency  under fixed exchange  rates, 
is not among the numerous  "balances"  now calculated  in the official  U.S. 
balance-of-payments  statistics.50 
The proponent of a Keynesian approach to payments adjustment argues, in con- 
trast, for the exclusion of international  transactions  in short-term  liquid assets from his 
aggregate balance-of-payments  model because "gross reserve positions and the distri- 
bution of the stock of international  short-term assets among nations have little effect 
upon international economic policy." See H.  Peter Gray, An Aggregate Theory of 
International  Payments  Adjustment  (Macmillan, 1974), p. 36. 
49.  William J.  Fellner, "'Monetary' versus 'Monetarist' Theories: Drawing the 
Distinction," in Clark and others, Effects of Exchange  Rate Adjustment. 
50. Kemp, in "Balance-of-Payments  Concepts," p. 22, calculates such a balance for 
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The Dual of the Monetary  Approach:  The Asset Approach 
to Exchange-Rate  Determination 
All of the discussion  so far has assumed  a regime  of fixed-or  pegged- 
exchange  rates.  Only  under  such a regime  do balance-of-payments  disequi- 
librium and its adjustment  become policy issues. But the analytical  ap- 
proach  has its counterpart,  or dual, in a world of freely  flexible  exchange 
rates:  the asset-market  approach  to exchange-rate  determination.  The fun- 
damental  symmetry  of the long-run  stock-equilibrium  implications  of the 
two approaches  can be seen in equations  1 through  6. These equations  can 
be used to solve for an endogenous  exchange  rate with only one modifica- 
tion: since  the exchange  rate  now varies  to maintain  payments  equilibrium 
throughout,  reserve  movements  are always zero and the national money 
stock in each country  becomes  an exogenous  variable  under  the control of 
its monetary authority.  The long-run equilibrium  exchange rate is then 
determined  by the relationship  between  the price  levels in the two countries 
(equation  2), each of which  is in turn  a function  of the relationship  between 
the desired  and the actual stock of national  money (equation 1).5 (Note, 
incidentally,  that a regime of flexible exchange  rates implies two distinct 
national moneys, separated  by the changing price relationship  between 
them, and eliminates  any meaningful  concept of a world money stock.) 
Despite the long-run symmetry  between the monetary approach under 
pegged  rates and its flexible-rate  analogue,  the adjustment  process  is quite 
different  in the two regimes.  Under fixed exchange  rates,  quantities  adjust 
gradually,  in the form  of reserve  flows, to bring  about equality  between  the 
actual  stock of money and the desired  level of real  balances.  Under  flexible 
51. The exchange rate will also be determined  by the requirements  of asset-market 
equilibrium  in the short run, even if limitations on commodity arbitrage  are assumed 
to  permit the emergence of temporary deviations from the purchasing-power-parity 
condition of equation 2.  In this case, the condition for money-market equilibrium, 
L =  M,  must be rewritten (for the home country, and analogously for the foreign 
country) as 
M 
wP +  (1-w)P*e 
where w is a weight, and M determines  e directly. For a more detailed discussion of the 
monetary approach to exchange-rate  determination in the short run versus the long 
run, see Rudiger Dornbusch, "The Theory of Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes and 
Macroeconomic Policy," Scandinavian  Journal of Economics  (formerly Swedish  Journal 
of Economics)  (forthcoming, 1976). Marina  v. N. Whitman  517 
rates, with the nominal quantity  of money fixed in each country,  changes 
in the valuation  of the stock through  changes  in the exchange  rate bring 
about instantaneous  full stock adjustment  in the money market.52 
Unfortunately,  this stripped-down  model is inadequate  to generate  some 
of the more interesting  policy implications  of the asset approach  to ex- 
change-rate  analysis.  Two extensions,  in particular,  are critical:  One is the 
specification  of assumptions  regarding  the formation  of expectations.  Ob- 
viously, expectations  play no role in the determination  of the stationary- 
state equilibrium  itself, since  they must be static  under  that condition.  But 
they will significantly  influence  the dynamic  adjustment  path in a model in 
which  the exchange  rate  is determined  by the stock-equilibrium  conditions 
appropriate  to asset markets rather than by the equality between flow 
supply and flow demand  that characterizes  commodity  markets.  The pos- 
sible explanations  of how expectations  are formed  are numberless,  so that 
a wide variety of conclusions regarding  the impact effect of exchange- 
market  disturbances  and the nature of the dynamic  adjustment  path can 
emerge  within  the general  framework  of the asset-market  approach.  It turns 
out, however,  that several  widely used simple  models of expectations  for- 
mation yield one common result: when there are adjustment  lags, the im- 
pact effect of a disturbance  on the exchange  rate will exceed the long-run 
equilibrium  effect; that is, the exchange  rate will initially  overshoot  in re- 
sponse  to a disturbance,  and then  retreat  gradually  toward  its new  long-run 
equilibrium  value along the dynamic  adjustment  path.53 
A second important  extension  of the model is the introduction  of a sec- 
ond financial  asset-bonds-and,  with it, the rate of interest. Given this 
additional  market,  the long-run  condition for stationary-state  equilibrium 
in asset  markets  requires  that the current-account  balance  be equal  to zero, 
so that the total stock of wealth  is unchanging,  and that international  flows 
of capital thus be zero as well.54  This particular  extension  makes possible 
the analysis  of the effects  of fiscal  as well as monetary  policy. One implica- 
tion of this extended  model, for example,  is the critical  role played  by inter- 
52. Frenkel and Rodriguez, "Portfolio Equilibrium,"  and Pentti J. K. Kouri, "The 
Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments in the Short Run and in the Long Run: 
A Monetary Approach," Scandinavian  Journal  of Economics  (forthcoming, 1976). 
53. See, for example, ibid. 
54. The portfolio-balance  requirements  could also be met inprinciple  by what Mundell 
calls quasi-equilibrium,  in which the government deficit (which pumps financial assets 
into the private sector) exactly equals the trade deficit (which drains such assets out of 
that sector). See Mundell, International  Economics,  p. 226. 518  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1975 
national  capital  mobility in the relative  efficacy  of fiscal policy under dif- 
ferent  exchange-rate  regimes.  Applying the conventional  IS-LM analysis 
to an open economy without capital  mobility, one can easily demonstrate 
that fiscal  policy has a greater  impact  on domestic  economic  activity  under 
flexible  than under  fixed  rates,  because  the exchange  rate will always  move 
so as to prevent  any reduction  in the domestic  multiplier  effect  via leakage 
through  the trade  balance.  But the domestic  impact  of fiscal  policy falls as 
capital  mobility  increases  until, with fully integrated  capital  markets,  fiscal 
policy becomes  totally ineffective  as a domestic  stabilization  tool. Any ex- 
pansionary  measure,  such as increasing  net government  expenditures  (with 
a given  money  supply),  wili put upward  pressure  on the rate  of interest.  The 
resulting  inflow of capital  will cause an appreciation  of the currency,  and 
the resulting  deflationary  impact  on the trade  balance  will exactly  offset  the 
initial multiplier  effect of fiscal policy on domestic income. With a given 
liquidity-preference  schedule  and an exogenously  frozen interest  rate, the 
requirements  of money-market  equilibrium  will prevent  any change  in do- 
mestic  income  without  a change  in the money  supply,  and "global  crowding 
out" will render  fiscal policy useless.55 
One of the arguments  frequently  advanced  in favor of flexible  exchange 
rates is that they enable countries  to insulate themselves  from monetary 
disturbances  originating  abroad, bottling up such disturbances  in their 
country  of origin.  And, indeed, in the simple  model of equations 1-6, this 
is the case. An increase  in the foreign money supply, which under fixed 
rates  would lead ultimately  to increases  in the domestic  money supply  and 
price level equal to those abroad,  would, under  flexible  rates, be offset by 
an appreciation  of the domestic  currency  in response  to the incipient  sur- 
plus arising  from  the foreign  excess  supply  of money; and  that appreciation 
would leave the domestic  money supply, price level, and all domestic  real 
variables  unchanged. 
Once interest  rates and internationally  mobile securities  are introduced 
into the picture,  however,  the insulation  provided  by flexible  exchange  rates 
becomes incomplete.  Now an increase  in the foreign money supply will 
lower  interest  rates  not only in the country  where  the disturbance  originates 
but in the home country  as well. With  an unchanged  domestic  money  stock, 
an  upward-sloping  LM curve  requires  that the lower  interest  rate  be accom- 
55. See Whitman, Policies for Internal and External Balance, pp. 20-21. The speed 
with which this "crowding  out" occurs depends on how rapidly  trade flows are assumed 
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panied by a lower level of income if money-market  equilibrium  is to be 
maintained.  Flexible exchange  rates do not abolish interdependence  in a 
world of capital  mobility.56  Indeed,  Cooper  has pointed  out that the impact 
of certain  types of disturbances  abroad  may actually  be aggravated  rather 
than softened  or eliminated  by flexibility  of exchange  rates.  As an example, 
he cites an exogenous  shift in asset preferences  that increases  the foreign 
demand  for domestic securities  at a constant rate of interest.  The result 
would be an appreciation  of the domestic  currency,  leading  to a current- 
account  deficit,  and a reduction  of domestic  aggregate  demand  and income 
(as well as, in a two-commodity  model, a reallocation  of resources  away 
from tradable  and toward nontradable  goods)."7  Thus, the insulation of 
countries  from disturbances  originating  abroad  provided  by freely  flexible 
exchange rates depends heavily on the type of disturbance  assumed to 
dominate  in the international  arena. 
In a world of rate flexibility,  exchange-market  disequilibrium  is mea- 
sured,  not by any payments  "balance,"  but rather  by changes  in the effec- 
tive (that is, weighted)  exchange  rate of the dollar  vis-4-vis  other  countries. 
But here,  again,  the asset-market  approach  views such  changes  as reflecting 
disequilibrium  in the distribution  of the world's  stock of money (or finan- 
cial assets  in general),  in contrast  to the conventional  Keynesian  approach, 
which is more apt to analyze them in terms of flow disequilibrium  in the 
goods or securities  markets.58  In a world  of managed  floating,  market  pres- 
sures on a currency  are reflected  both in the net international  flow of re- 
serves and in movements  in the effective  exchange  rate, although  no one 
has yet developed  a single composite  unit to measure  empirically  the total 
pressure  reflected  through  both these channels. 
Finally, the monetary approach  implies a definition of "international 
policy coordination"  in a world of managed  floating somewhat  different 
from  that of conventional  analysis.  It is widely  recognized  that, in order  to 
avoid inconsistency  among  exchange-rate  targets  under  such a regime  and 
a resulting  disorder  similar  to the competitive  depreciations  of the 1930s, 
56. Arnold Collery, "Macro-economics in an Open Economy under Purchasing- 
Power Parity," in Aliber, ed., National Monetary Policies, and Rudiger Dornbusch, 
"Flexible Exchange Rates,  Capital Mobility and  Macroeconomic Equilibrium," in 
Classen and Salin, eds., Recent Issues in International  Monetary  Economics. 
57. Richard N.  Cooper, "Monetary Theory and Policy in  an Open Economy," 
Scandinavian  Journal  of Economics  (forthcoming, 1976). 
58. For an empirical  evaluation of the equilibrium  dollar-mark  exchange rate within 
the monetary framework, see Citibank Money International,  vol.  3 (April 30, 1975). 520  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
rules  for intervention  in the exchange  markets  are  essential.59  The monetary 
approach  stresses,  however,  that rules for intervention  are fundamentally 
inadequate  to the problem  of inconsistent  targets,  since there  is more than 
one means  to pursue  such  targets.  "A government  can cause  its currency  to 
depreciate  almost  as well by having  its central  bank  buy domestic  bonds as 
by having  it buy foreign  currency."60  On the other side, the recent  history 
of managed  floating  is replete  with instances  of countries  supporting  their 
currencies  indirectly,  through  foreign  borrowing,  rather  than directly  in the 
exchange  markets.  What is crucial  is the relationship  between  the demand 
for and the supply of money, not whether  the money is created  by buying 
(or selling) domestic or foreign assets. Thus, true policy coordination  to 
avoid inconsistent  target setting requires,  in the monetary  approach,  not 
rules governing  intervention  in the exchange  markets,  but rules guaran- 
teeing the compatibility  of national monetary  policies, and fiscal policies 
to the extent  that they are  financed  by money  creation  or affect  the demand 
for money. International  coordination as defined by the monetary ap- 
proach is much more demanding,  and much more restrictive  of national 
economic  sovereignty,  than the limited  rules  for exchange-market  interven- 
tion that are  conventionally  regarded  as the means  of avoiding  inconsistent 
and thus destabilizing  exchange-rate  targets  among nations.' 
Some Empirical  Issues  Unresolved 
In any attempt  to evaluate  the contribution  of global monetarism  and 
the monetary  approach  to the analysis  of current  policy issues, certain  ob- 
vious  empirical  questions  arise. 
59. The question of rules for intervention  was a major topic in the IMF's discussions 
of international  monetary  reform.  See Committee  on Reform of the International  Mone- 
tary System and Related Issues (Committee  of Twenty), International  Monetary  Reform: 
Documents of the Committee  of  Twenty (International Monetary Fund, 1974), annex 
4, sec. B. 
60.  Michael Mussa, "The Exchange Rate, the Balance of Payments, and Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy under a Regime of Controlled Floating," Scandinavian  Journal of 
Economics  (forthcoming, 1976). 
61. Furthermore,  a recent study concludes that "the systematic use of sterilization 
policies by two or more countries . .  . may lead to explosive reserve flows and, there- 
fore, to the breakdown of the system."  Paul De Grauwe, "The Interaction  of Monetary 
Policies in a Group of European  Countries,"  Journal  of International  Economics,  vol. 5 
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LAW  OF ONE  PRICE 
For one thing,  how realistic  is the assumption  of the "law  of one price," 
or of a high degree  of substitutability  across national boundaries  in both 
commodity  and financial-asset  markets?62 
The assumption  really  takes two forms, depending  on the length of run 
and the adjustment  mechanism  involved. The weaker  form is that of the 
purchasing-power-parity  concept, which asserts  that, over long periods of 
time (decades,  for example),  changes  in exchange  rates tend to offset-or 
be offset  by-changes in relative  price  levels.  This concept  has stood up well 
to empirical  verification  for long periods,  although  there  is ample  evidence 
of substantial  short-run  deviations.63  The "law of one price" asserts sub- 
stantially  more, however, than a long-run tendency toward purchasing- 
power  parity  among  countries.  In particular,  it asserts  that high elasticities 
of substitution  prevail  among  countries  for most tradable  goods and finan- 
cial assets, and that, because  world  markets  are highly integrated,  a single 
price  must prevail  in all markets  for goods and assets  that are close substi- 
tutes for one another.  This view implies  that competitive  forces  will  quickly 
and directly  eliminate  changes  in relative  prices stemming  from exchange- 
rate changes by offsetting  changes in domestic prices. Although recent 
studies  indicate  a very high degree  of market  integration  and international 
substitutability  for primary commodities, other investigations  conclude 
that the close-substitutes  hypothesis  fails to hold for manufactured  goods 
in general  for the time periods examined  and at the levels of aggregation 
employed;  that is, "the  relative  dollar  prices  of industrial  outputs  do seem 
62. Although Frenkel has argued forcefully for "the irrelevance  of commodity arbi- 
trage" in the asset view of exchange-rate  determination  (and thus, by extension, in the 
monetary  approach  to balance-of-payments  analysis), the fact remains  that this assump- 
tion is common to many of the models of this genre. And it is certainly  essential for the 
derivation of many of the strong policy implications of full-fledged  global monetarism. 
See Jacob A. Frenkel, "A Monetary  Approach  to the Exchange  Rate: Doctrinal Aspects 
and Empirical  Evidence," Scandinavian  Journal  of Economics  (forthcoming, 1976). 
63. On the first point, see Harry  J. Gailliot, "Purchasing  Power Parity  as an Explana- 
tion of Long-Term  Changes in Exchange  Rates," Journal  of Money, Credit  and Banking, 
vol. 2 (August 1970),  pp. 348-57, and Arthur  B. Laffer,  "The Phenomenon  of Worldwide 
Inflation: A Study in International Market Integration," in David I. Meiselman and 
Arthur B. Laffer, eds., The Phenomenon  of  Worldwide  Inflation  (American Enterprise 
Institute, 1975), pp. 27-52. On the second point see, for example, Ronald I. McKinnon, 
"Floating Exchange Rates, 1973-74: The Emperor's  New Clothes," Journal  of Mone- 
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to change  substantially  and permanently  [over  the six-year  period 1968-73] 
when  exchange  rates  change."64  Estimates  made  in two recent  studies  imply 
that the United States can expect to retain for some time over half of a 
change  in the effective  exchange  rate in the form of a relative  price advan- 
tage for manufactured  exports.65  Similarly,  there  is empirical  evidence  that, 
despite  increasing  integration  of financial  markets,  investors  do not regard 
foreign and domestic long-term  financial  assets as perfect substitutes  for 
one another.66  For short-term  money-market  assets,  in which  international 
integration  has proceeded  the furthest,  the evidence  on the degree  of inde- 
pendence  retained  by national  interest  rates  is somewhat  inconclusive.67 
STERILIZATION 
Another empirical  question-one  that is central  not only to the strong 
conclusions  of global  monetarism  but also to the weaker  ones of the mone- 
tary  approach-is whether  governments  can and do engage  in a "deliberate 
nullification"  of the impact  of a payments  imbalance  on the domestic  sup- 
ply of money. By now, a considerable  literature  has arisen  from empirical 
investigations  of the extent  to which  various  nations at various  times have 
successfully  "sterilized,"  or offset the effects of a payments  imbalance  on 
the domestic  monetary  base, and also of the extent to which the domestic 
impact of  monetary policy is  offset by  international capital flows.68 
64. Peter Isard, "The Price Effects of Exchange  Rate Changes: Some Evidence from 
Industry Data for the United States, Germany, and Japan, 1968-73," in Clark and 
others, Effects of Exchange  Rate Adjustment. 
65. J. R. Artus, "The Behavior of Manufactured  Export Prices," and S. Y. Kwack, 
"The Effects of Foreign Inflation on Domestic Prices and the Relative Price Advantage 
of Exchange Rate Changes," in ibid. 
66. Herbert G.  Grubel, *Internationally  Diversified Portfolios: Welfare Gains and 
Capital Flows," American  Economic  Review,  vol. 58, pt. 1 (December 1968), pp. 1299- 
1314. 
67. See, for example, Richard J. Herring and Richard C. Marston, "The Monetary 
Sector in an Open Economy: An Empirical  Analysis for Canada and Germany,"  Work- 
ing Paper 7-74 (University of Pennsylvania,  Rodney L. White Center for Financial Re- 
search, 1974; processed), and Richard C. Marston, American  Monetary  Policy and the 
Structure of  the Eurodollar Market, Princeton Studies in  International Finance 34 
(Princeton  University, International  Finance Section, 1974). 
68. See, for example, Victor Argy and Pentti J. K. Kouri, "Sterilization  Policies and 
the Volatility in International  Reserves," and Warren  D. McClam, "Monetary Growth 
and the Euro-currency  Market," in Aliber, ed., National Monetary  Policies; Herring 
and Marston, "Monetary Sector in an Open Economy"; Pentti J. K.  Kouri, "The 
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While these studies indicate  that at least some degree of sterilization  has 
been or could be undertaken  in the short run by the countries  surveyed, 
they also suggest a wide range of experience,  even among industrialized 
nations. Considerable  evidence  indicates  that Japan, for example,  has in 
recent  years  been able to sterilize  most of the balance-of-payments  impact 
on its monetary  base; in Germany,  conversely,  the money supply  has been 
much closer to being endogenously  determined  even in the short run. At 
least one instance of "perverse"  behavior-that  is, reinforcement  rather 
than neutralization  of the balance-of-payments  impact on the monetary 
base-has  been suggested  by the data. Besides  indicating  wide  variations  in 
experience  among countries, the studies conducted so far have all been 
subject  to serious problems  of simultaneity,  revealing  the need for much 
more work to develop  better  empirical  tests of the general  applicability  of 
the monetary  approach  and its policy implications. 
In contrast  to this general  uncertainty,  the United States  is clearly  a spe- 
cial case, for which the money supply is primarily  an exogenous  variable, 
controlled  by the monetary  authorities,  rather  than the endogenous  vari- 
able postulated  by the monetary  approach.  This is partly  a simple matter 
of size; as Swoboda  has noted, the monetary  approach  implies  that, under 
fixed  exchange  rates  and with  money  multipliers  assumed  equal  in all coun- 
tries, open-market  purchases of securities  cause reserve losses that are 
inversely  proportional  to the country's  relative  economic  size and thus ex- 
pansions  in the domestic  money supply in direct  proportion  to that size.69 
To put it another  way, even though  the monetary  approach  implies  that no 
country can alter its share of the world money stock through monetary 
policy, the sheer  size of the U.S. share  ensures  its ability  to alter the total 
magnitude  of the world money stock and thus the size of its own money 
supply.  For an economy  as large  as the United States,  monetary  policy re- 
tains a domestic  impact,  even under  fixed exchange  rates in an integrated 
world economy. 
tary Economics, vol.  1 (January 1975), pp. 21-39;  Norman C. Miller and Sherry S. 
Askin, "Domestic and International Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and 
Bankinig  (forthcoming, 1976); and Niels Thygesen, "Monetary Policy, Capital Flows 
and Internal Stability: Some Experiences from Large Industrial Countries," Swedish 
Journal of Economics, vol. 75 (March 1973), pp. 83-99, as well as other studies cited 
in the aforementioned. 
69. Relative economic size is measured  in terms of the country's share of the world's 
money supply. See Alexander  K. Swoboda, "Gold, Dollars, Eurodollars  and the World 
Money Stock" (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International  Studies, 1974; processed), 
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In addition  to this sort of indirect  control  that a large economy  has over 
its own money supply,  it can also exercise  direct  control  to the extent that 
it can effectively  sterilize  the impact  of the balance  of payments  on its do- 
mestic money supply.70  Presumably,  the capacity to sterilize is partly a 
function of a country's  economic  size, as well as of the size of its stock of 
international  reserves.  But the status of the United States  as a reserve-cur- 
rency  country  is probably  even  more  important  than  its weight  in the world 
economy  in enabling  it to neutralize  the feedback  from the balance  of pay- 
ments  to the domestic  money  supply.  As noted above, a measured  deficit  in 
the balance of payments  of a reserve-currency  country  may be accompa- 
nied, not by any loss of primary  reserve  assets, but rather  by an increase 
in certain  kinds of liabilities  to foreign  monetary  authorities.  The creation 
of these liabilities will often result in partial or full automatic steriliza- 
tion of the balance-of-payments  impact  on the U.S. money  supply,  without 
any deliberate  action on the part of the U.S. monetary  authorities.7"  Given 
both its size and its reserve-currency  position, it is hardly  surprising  that 
the sterilization  coefficients  estimated  for the United States in empirical 
studies  have generally  not differed  significantly  from unity. For the United 
States, the domestic  money supply remains  an exogenous  policy variable 
even under  fixed exchange  rates  and in the face of increasing  international 
integration  of markets. 
Effective  "deliberate  nullification"  in the case of the United States-and 
perhaps  other  countries,  as their  currencies  are increasingly  held as reserve 
assets-by  no means negates all the policy implications  of the monetary 
approach.  Specifically,  it does not disturb  the postulated  relationship  be- 
tween domestic monetary policy and the balance of payments, nor the 
channels by which domestic disturbances  in the sterilizing  country are 
transmitted  to the rest of the world. It also introduces  three important 
changes  into the analysis:  (1) It restores  monetary  policy as a policy vari- 
able operating  on the domestic economy, under fixed as well as flexible 
exchange  rates. (2) It destroys  the symmetry  whereby  a given amount of 
domestic  money creation  has the same  impact  on the world  money supply, 
regardless  of the origin  of the disturbance;  asymmetries  are introduced  be- 
cause low-powered  money in a reserve-currency  country becomes high- 
70. Swoboda notes that a successful sterilization policy in one country gives that 
country an effective weight of one in the determination of the world's money stock 
(ibid., p. 10). The same point is noted in Girton and Roper, "Monetary Model." 
71. Swoboda, "Gold, Dollars, Eurodollars,"  pp. 15-18. Marina v. N.  Whitman  525 
powered, or base, money in other countries.  (3) It renders  the monetary 
policy of all countries  other than the reserve-currency  country  totally in- 
effective  and ensures  that they bear the full burden  of the classical  adjust- 
ment process.72  In addition,  in the case of a reserve-currency  country,  the 
a priori  relationship  between  changes  in the money supply  and the balance 
of payments  is negative,  as opposed to the positive relationship  that pre- 
vails in the case of non-reserve-currency  countries,  whose money supplies 
are indeed  endogenous.  Finally,  note that no more than one country  in the 
system  can sterilize  completely  the impact of payments  imbalances  on its 
money supply  without destabilizing  the system  as a whole.73 
In addition to efforts to estimate sterilization  coefficients,  a few more 
comprehensive  attempts  have been made to test the monetary  approach  to 
the balance  of payments,  either  alone or by comparing  it with alternative 
approaches-for example,  to the analysis  of the balance-of-payments  im- 
pact of devaluation.74  Such tests are hampered  by a number  of technical 
difficulties,  chief among  them  the fact that direct  estimation  of the balance- 
of-payments  equation  implied  by the monetary  approach  involves  the esti- 
mation  of an accounting  identity  rather  than a true  behavioral  relationship. 
Thus, only indirect  tests of some of the implications  of the monetary  ap- 
proach are legitimate, and these are inevitably arbitrary  and subject to 
varying  interpretations.  Furthermore,  no investigator  has combined  all the 
variables  associated  with the various  approaches  to devaluation  in a single 
equation,  as would  be required  for an appropriate  comparison  of their  rela- 
72. For an analysis of the gold-exchange standard along these lines, see Jacques 
Rueff, Balance of Payments  (Macmillan, 1967). 
73. See De Grauwe, "Interaction  of Monetary Policies." 
74. Among such studies are B. B. Aghevli and M. S. Kahn, "The Monetary  Approach 
to Balance of Payments  Determination:  An Empirical  Test," in International  Monetary 
Fund, Thze  Monetary  Approach  to the Balance of Payments:  An Anthology  (forthcoming, 
1976); B. Brittain and Sri Kumar, "Monetary Balance of Payments Theory: Implica- 
tions and Tests," Working Paper (First National City Bank, 1974; processed);  Thomas 
J. Courchene, "The Price-Specie-Flow  Mechanism and the Gold-Exchange Standard," 
in Johnson  and Swoboda,  eds.,  Economics  of Common Currencies; Hans  Genberg,  "An 
Empirical  Comparison  of Alternative  Models of Currency  Devaluation"  (Geneva: Grad- 
uate Institute of International  Studies, November 1974; processed); Wolfgang Kasper, 
"The Emergence of  an Active Exchange-Rate Policy-Some  Quantitative Lessons," 
in Kasper, ed., International  Monetary Experiments  and Experiences,  Papers and Pro- 
ceedings of the Symposium on International  Monetary Problems, Port Stephens, Aus- 
tralia, August 1975 (Canberra,  Australia: forthcoming, 1976); Pentti J. K. Kouri and 
Michael G. Porter, "International  Capital Flows and Portfolio Equilibrium,"  Jouirnal 
of Political Economy, vol. 82 (May/June 1974), pp. 443-67. See also the various em- 
pirical studies in Frenkel and Johnson, eds., Monetary  Approach. 526  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
tive explanatory  power. In any case, apart from these technical  problems, 
the various  efforts  to test the monetary  approach  directly  have proved in- 
conclusive,  with estimated  coefficients  turning  out significant  with the cor- 
rect  sign  in some  cases  but not in others,  and with  the estimated  magnitudes 
of the coefficients  frequently differing significantly  from their a priori 
values.  At present,  both supporters  and critics of the monetary  approach 
can find considerable  ammunition  in empirical  results. As Blinder and 
Solow have noted with respect  to the various empirical  tests of the com- 
peting  hypotheses  of monetarism  and Keynesianism  in a closed-economy 
context, "The issue is simply  not to be settled by comparing  goodness of 
fit of one-equation  models  that are  far  too primitive  to represent  any  theory 
adequately."75 
MANAGED  FLEXIBILITY 
Finally, one must ask whether  the monetary  approach-or, indeed,  any 
existing balance-of-payments  theory-is  applicable to  the international 
monetary  framework  within  which  the world now operates.  The monetary 
theory  is well defined  for a world on the gold standard  or even for a world 
of pegged  exchange  rates  in which  parities  are  changed  infrequently.76  And 
it has an analogue-the  asset approach  to exchange-rate  determination- 
for a world of freely  flexible  exchange  rates without government  interven- 
tion. But the rules by which  the monetary  authorities  conduct  themselves, 
and the implications  of those rules  for the behavioral  properties  of a world 
of managed  flexibility,  have yet to be explored.  The implicit assumption 
made by many analysts  is that managed  flexibility  can be fully character- 
ized as a situation "somewhere  between"  fixed and freely flexible rates, 
which  can be formally  incorporated  by introducing  a "combined"  variable 
to represent  pressure  on the currency  in the form either  of reserve  flows or 
of changes  in the effective  exchange  rate. But certain  anomalies  in recent 
experience-such as the apparent  failure  of the worldwide  demand  for re- 
serves  to decline  substantially  with the greater  flexibility  of exchange  rates 
-suggest  that the behavioral  characteristics  of managed  flexibility  may be 
qualitatively  different  from  those of a pegged-rate  or freely  flexible  regime, 
rather  than some simple average  of the characteristics  of the two limiting 
cases. 
75. "Analytical  Foundations," p. 65. 
76. It does not encompass, however, any of  the expectational or other dynamic 
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Some Fundamental  Issues  in Political  Economy 
Some significant  issues in political economy arise in any attempt to 
evaluate  the analytical  contributions  and policy relevance  of the challenges 
to current  orthodoxy  that are the focus of this survey. In discussing  the 
issues, two major distinctions  between  global monetarism  and the mone- 
tary approach must be borne in mind. First, as an earlier section has 
emphasized,  the monetary approach  is only one of the three strands of 
assumptions  that  define  global  monetarism,  along  with  the full-employment 
assumption  and  the "law  of one price  level"  (or, in some  models,  the "small 
country"  assumption).  Second, whereas  both global monetarism  and the 
monetary  approach  tend to focus on the characteristics  of the system in 
stationary-state  equilibrium,  adherents  of the monetary  approach  generally 
recognize  that such long-run  tendencies  are compatible  with many specifi- 
cations of impact effects and dynamic adjustment  mechanisms;  extreme 
global monetarism,  on the other hand, tends to draw  policy implications 
from  the characteristics  of long-run  stock-equilibria,  suggesting  by implica- 
tion that they are actually  achieved  rapidly  enough to make the character- 
istics of the transition  unimportant. 
Indeed, this question-"How  long is the long run?"-is  critical  to the 
applicability  of stationary-state  general-equilibrium  analysis to policy is- 
sues. It is important  for the positive  economics  of forecasting,  because  the 
more gradual  is the approach  to equilibrium,  the more certain it is that 
disturbances  and changes in behavioral  parameters  will impinge during 
that approach,  deflecting  the economy  from  its initial  path to the new equi- 
librium,  and the more difficult  it becomes to estimate  the ceteris  paribus 
effect of a particular  exogenous  change.  The question  is significant  for the 
normative  economics  of policy prescription  as well, not simply  because  of 
the notoriously short time horizon of policymakers  but, more funda- 
mentally,  because  of the very real social costs that may be associated  with 
disequilibrium  states or with different  adjustment  mechanisms. 
Thus, the factors  that affect  the speed of adjustment  to equilibrium  be- 
come important: the effectiveness  of commodity arbitrage  across inter- 
national boundaries,  the degree of capital mobility, the strength  of real- 
balance effects, and the proportion of traded  to nontraded  goods in the 
economy.  It makes  no difference  to the nature  of the full-equilibrium  state 
whether  purchasing-power  parity is thought to be established  via perfect 
substitutability  and international  arbitrage,  or is regarded  as a monetary 528  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1975 
phenomenon  independent  of such arbitrage.  But it does make a very sub- 
stantial  difference  to the length of run implied  for the adjustment  process. 
To put the problem  slightly  differently,  economists  disagree  relatively  little 
about  the long-run  general-equilibrium  characteristics  of the economic  sys- 
tem. But for the short run, when the system diverges  either  from some of 
the behavioral  relations  or from one or more equilibrium  conditions,  there 
is substantial  disagreement  about which relationships  can be assumed  to 
hold throughout  and which not, about which markets  can be assumed  to 
be continuously  in equilibrium  and which not. And, the longer  the "short 
run" is, the more important  these divergences  become in determining  the 
policy implications  of the competing  approaches. 
Closely related  to the question of the length of run over which adjust- 
ment takes  place is the question  of whether  the assumption  of fundamental 
stability  that underlies  equilibrium  analysis  is valid. If the world is in fact 
subject  to frequent  disturbances  and shifts in behavioral  parameters,  then 
the equilibrium  model is not appropriate  for policy analysis,  nor is it ob- 
vious that a mode of analysis  that always  begins  with equilibrium  can yield 
meaningful  answers  for a system whose initial state is inevitably  disequi- 
librium. Furthermore,  a fundamental  proposition of global monetarism 
(and, to a lesser extent of the monetary  approach)  is that strong self-cor- 
rective tendencies  operate  in the economic system. But disturbances  may 
in fact be cumulative  rather  than self-correcting;  Okun has argued  that, 
in fact, "the [econometric]  evidence of both Keynesian and monetarist 
models of economic activity suggests  that we live in an economy of per- 
sistence,  rather  than self-correction."77 
Implicit in the monetary  approach  to the balance of payments, which 
views it from the bottom up, focusing  on changes  in reserve  stocks,78  is the 
77. Arthur M. Okun, "Fiscal-Monetary  Activism: Some Analytical Issues," BPEA, 
1:1972, p. 147. More specifically, Meltzer argues that if the global-monetarist  model 
(which he calls the Mundell model) is modified to incorporate fiscal policy, the fixed- 
exchange-rate  system is likely to be unstable. See Allan H.  Meltzer, "The Monetary 
Approach to Inflation and the Balance of Payments:  Theoretical  and Empirical  Contri- 
butions at the Leuven Conference,"  in Michele Fratianni  and Karel K. Tavernier,  eds., 
supplement  to the journal,  Kredit  und  Kapital,  published  in West Germany  (forthcoming, 
1976). 
78. Harry Johnson argues that "the crucial distinction for the Yale  School  [of 
Keynesians] . .  . is between the financial sector and the real sector (or between stock 
and flow analysis)  rather  than between the banking system and the rest of the economy 
(as various versions of the contemporary  quantity theory would have it) ....."  Further 
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assumption  that changes  in the composition  of the balance  among  the non- 
monetary  items "above  the line" are irrelevant.  By contrast,  the Keynesian 
approach,  which  looks separately,  from the top down, at the forces  affect- 
ing each category  of transactions  grouped  into a "balance,"  views  the com- 
position of the balance  of payments  as itself  a relevant  question  for analysis 
and a legitimate  concern  of policy. The analytical  and policy relevance  of 
the composition  of the balance  of payments  must be considered  from two 
aspects.  One is the stability  of selected  subbalances  or categories  of inter- 
national transactions.  In particular,  the adjustment  costs associated  with 
reallocation  of factors  of production  suggest  that  fluctuations  in the goods- 
and-services  account may well have a negative  rather  than a neutral  im- 
pact on the economy  even if offsetting  changes  in some other  account  pre- 
vent any net balance-of-payments  effect.  This view, certainly,  is implicit  in 
the persistent  focus of Keynesian  analysis on the goods-and-services  ac- 
count. The second aspect is whether different  levels of particular  sub- 
accounts may have different welfare implications and therefore be  a 
legitimate  focus of analysis.  Keynesians  frequently  argue,  for example,  that 
the persistence  of unemployment  and downward  wage rigidity  makes the 
goods-and-services  account  a legitimate  instrument  of full-employment  pol- 
icy. At a more sophisticated  level, Williamson  has recently  used the tools 
of optimal-control  theory to demonstrate  that different  combinations  of 
current-  and capital-account  balances  have different  implications  for inter- 
national indebtedness  and thus will trace out different  growth paths of 
consumption.  His analysis  implies,  furthermore,  that only under  very spe- 
cial assumptions  will the dynamically  optimal composition  coincide with 
the composition  that would  be generated  by a market-determined  exchange 
rate.79  Thus, it would appear  that both the Keynesian  and the monetary 
approaches  can be faulted  in their handling  of balance-of-payments  com- 
position.  Keynesian  analysis  overlooks  the interdependence  among  the var- 
ious accounts  through  failure  to incorporate  the stock-equilibrium  condi- 
tions that bind them  together.  The monetary  approach,  on the other  hand, 
tends to neglect the particular  configuration  of the current and capital 
79. J. H. Williamson, "On the Normative Theory of Balance-of-Payments  Adjust- 
ment," in G. Clayton and others, eds., Monetary Theory  and Monetary  Policy in the 
1970s, Proceedings  of the 1970 Sheffield  Money Seminar (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), pp. 235-56. The problem of a nonoptimal composition of the balance of 
payments is also noted in Alexander K. Swoboda, "Monetary Policy under Fixed Ex- 
change Rates: Effectiveness,  the Speed of Adjustment, and Proper Use," Economica, 
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accounts  associated  with the period of transition  to stationary-state  equi- 
librium,  and thus to overlook the economic effects of different  levels of 
indebtedness,  which are the stock counterpart  of different  payment con- 
figurations,  not only on the adjustment  path, but also on the long-run 
equilibrium  itself in anything  other than the stationary  state. 
Indeed, once one acknowledges  that the nature of the adjustment  path 
may itself influence  the level at which long-run  equilibrium  is ultimately 
achieved,  it becomes  clear  that  the concentration  of the monetary  approach 
on  monetary  aggregates and  the  general  price  level  obscures  some  im- 
portant  questions.  In particular,  by generally  assuming  a one-to-one  rela- 
tionship between wages and prices, it tends to ignore the importance  of 
short-run  changes in this relationship  (which are likely in the wake of a 
devaluation,  for example),  not only for the distribution  of income,  but also 
for the level of employment,  the rate of investment,  and the rate of eco- 
nomic growth.80 
The various  questions  raised  so far apply, although  in differing  degrees, 
not only to global monetarism  but to the monetary approach as well. 
Most of the heterodox  policy implications  cited at the beginning  of this 
paper,  however,  are derived  from the full set of global-monetarist  assump- 
tions, including  the tendency  to regard  the conditions of stationary-state 
equilibrium  as relevant  for policy analysis.  The monetary  approach,  taken 
alone, raises  important  questions  about the efficacy  of exchange-rate  policy 
-or,  at least, focuses on some constraints  under which it operates-that 
were  frequently  ignored  in Keynesian  analysis.  In particular,  it makes  clear 
that countries  cannot persistently  inflate at different  rates without even- 
tually  forcing  a change  in the rate  of exchange  between  their  currencies,  and 
that these changes,  in turn, feed back onto the domestic  price  level in ways 
that are not fully reflected  in either elasticities  or multiplier  analysis.  But 
global monetarism  denies the utility not only of national exchange-rate 
policies, but also of any form of macroeconomic  stabilization  policy, both 
because  the level of real income is assumed  to be exogenous  and because 
the requirements  of stock equilibrium  deprive  exogenous  disturbances  of 
anything  beyond  transitional  effects  on real economic  variables.  Yet, in the 
80. For a monetary-approach  model that allows the wage-price  relationship  to vary, 
see Dornbusch, "Real and Monetary Aspects," cited in note 42. Changes in this rela- 
tionship are explicitly excluded by the assumptions  of global monetarism,  among which 
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real world, economies do in fact remain for considerable  periods in dis- 
equilibrium-in particular,  with persistent  unemployment-and both ex- 
ogenous disturbances  and stabilization  policies have nontrivial  effects.  In 
a world where  the stabilization  of income and employment  at high levels 
(or along a reasonable  growth  path) is a primary  concern  of policymakers, 
an analytical  model that eliminates  these concerns  by assumption  operates 
under  a certain  handicap. 
The macroeconomic  assumptions  of global monetarism  appear  to rest, 
explicitly  or implicitly,  on the microeconomic  foundations  provided  by the 
classical "pure,"  or barter,  model of international  specialization  and ex- 
change.  One of the critical  assumptions  of this model is that reallocations 
of production  along the aggregate  production-possibilities  curve  take place 
without  friction  or cost. Yet, in fact, the reallocation  of factors  of produc- 
tion from one use to another  imposes  real costs; in particular,  the real in- 
come lost as a result  of the unemployment  associated  with the reallocation 
process,  whether  or not it is subsumed  under  the rubric  of frictional  unem- 
ployment, represents  a permanent  loss to the society. Thus, a valid aim 
of government  policies is to minimize  the losses associated  with realloca- 
tion; or, more accurately,  to maximize  the benefits  net of the losses asso- 
ciated with it. 
The recognition  of adjustment  costs, and their  minimization,  as a legiti- 
mate target of economic  policy, also suggests  that the optimal  adjustment 
process  may vary  according  to the disturbance  that gives  rise  to it.81  In par- 
ticular, the changes in relative prices and associated factor reallocations 
that characterize  the classical  adjustment  mechanism  (under  both fixed  and 
flexible  rates)  may be essential  to restore  equilibrium  in the face of a trend 
disturbance  or one that takes  the form of a one-time  permanent  shift. Such 
81. The question of the optimum speed of adjustment  is also relevant, although the 
criteria are not well defined. Okun is concerned that the automatic price-adjustment 
mechanism (for example, under fixed rates) may be too  slow: "According to the St. 
Louis model, price flexibility works very slowly to restore equilibrium,  with a process 
of adjustment  that lasts for many years" ("Fiscal-Monetary  Activism," p. 150). While 
Gray also worries sometimes about the slowness of this adjustment  process (Aggregate 
Theory,  p. 4), at other points in his argument  (ibid., chap. 5), he is concerned that the 
market adjustment mechanism may sometimes work too quickly (for example, under 
flexible rates). Friedman argues that "there seems no reason to expect the timing or 
pace of adjustment under the assumed conditions [freely  flexible ratesi to be systemati- 
cally biased in one direction or the other from the optimumn .  ."  ("Case for Flexible 
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responses  may entail unnecessary  adjustment  costs, however, in the case 
of self-reversing  disturbances.82  The postwar  history of the "fundamental 
disequilibrium"  criterion  for exchange-rate  change  incorporated  in the Ar- 
ticles of Agreement  of the International  Monetary  Fund makes clear  how 
difficult  it is to distinguish  ex ante among the classes of disturbance,  and 
warns how great is the temptation  to diagnose a disturbance  as self-re- 
versing  in order to avoid the social and political pain of even necessary 
reallocations.  But the search for a least-cost adjustment  mechanism  re- 
mains valid, and the distinctions  among disturbances  just outlined imply 
that the "quasi-adjustments"  (or financing of imbalances)  that govern- 
ments  frequently  resort  to as alternatives  to the classical  adjustment  mecha- 
nism and its associated  reallocations  may indeed be, in the case of self- 
reversing  disturbances  (such as certain  shifts  in asset  preferences),  the least 
costly and therefore  the most appropriate  response.  Global monetarism, 
which  views all disturbances  and all responses  through  their  impact  on the 
demand  for and supply of money, inevitably  ignores  such distinctions,  to 
which the traditional  piecemeal Keynesian approach to balance-of-pay- 
ments analysis  and its policy implications  has tended to be more (some- 
times excessively)  sensitive. More generally,  global monetarism,  with its 
emphasis  on the automaticity  of the adjustment  process  and its suppression 
of structural  characteristics,  is ill suited  to the incorporation  of divergences 
between  private  and social optima. In contrast,  the traditional  Keynesian 
framework  views the achievement  of equilibrium-both internal  and ex- 
ternal-as  a specific  objective  of deliberate  government  policy, rather  than 
as the automatic  result of the operation  of market  forces.83 
Finally, there  is the question  of whether  the nation-state  or the world is 
the best primary  focus of analysis. The monetary approach has rightly 
called attention  to certain  long-run  tendencies  toward international  inte- 
gration  which  were  not reflected  in the Keynesian  analyses  of the fifties  and 
sixties.  Global  monetarism  goes much  further,  essentially  denying  any rele- 
vance to national boundaries.  In other words, its assumption  of perfect 
substitutability  and perfect arbitrage  across national boundaries  in both 
commodity and asset markets essentially  erases the distinction between 
"domestic"  and "foreign"  and implies  that only the world  (rather  than the 
82. Gray, Aggregate  Thleory,  chap. 5. 
83. Whitman,  Policies  for Internal  and External Balance, p. 2. Marina  v. N. Whitman  533 
national) values of variables  and parameters  are relevant to behavioral 
relationships.4 
As Cooper has noted, the efficiency  implications  of pure trade theory 
argue  that, for private  transactions,  the artificial  boundaries  of the nation- 
state should have no significance;  for private  markets  in both goods and 
factors of production,  the optimum  currency  area is the world. The eco- 
nomic  justification  for nation-states,  then, lies in the existence  of public or 
collective  goods and of differences  in the consumption  preferences  for such 
goods among  the citizens  of different  nations.5  The greater  the divergences 
among countries  with respect  to the transformation  curve or the indiffer- 
ence map for public goods, the greater  will be the welfare  costs of interna- 
tional economic  integration  in the sphere  of such goods that must be set off 
against  the efficiency  gains from integration  of private  markets.86 
Indeed,  one can read  in the recent  history  of international  economic  rela- 
tionships  a growing  tension  between  the rapid  increase-and acknowledged 
benefits-of  international  market  integration  in the private  sphere  and the 
almost total absence  of integration  or even coordination  of public policy 
across national  boundaries,  which reflects  at least in part a recognition  of 
the welfare  costs of such integration  where  collective  goods are concerned. 
It seems logical, then, that the global-monetarist  approach,  with its stress 
on the inherent  efficiency  and stability  of the private  sector  and its view of 
government  intervention  as a source of exogenous  shocks, should empha- 
size the openness  of national  economies  and the importance  of adjustment 
mechanisms  dependent  on market  integration,  and should rest its prefer- 
ence for fixed  over  flexible  exchange  rates  on the benefits  of market  integra- 
tion in the private  sector.  The Keynesian  approach,  on the other  hand,  sees 
government  as a stabilizer  of fluctuations  in the private  sector,  equilibrium 
as a state to be achieved by deliberate  policy intervention  rather than 
84. Meltzer argues that in such models "an essential difference  between the multi- 
currency  world that emerged under the Bretton Woods Agreement and the gold stan- 
dard is overlooked or neglected." See "Monetary Approach to Inflation and the Bal- 
ance of Payments." 
85. Richard N. Cooper, "Worldwide  vs. Regional Integration: Is There an Optimal 
Size of the Integrated  Area?" (paper presented at the Fourth World Congress of the 
International  Economic Association, Budapest, 1974; processed). 
86. For an example, in terms of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, 
see Marina v. N. Whitman, "Place Prosperity  and People Prosperity:  The Delineation 
of Optimum Policy Areas," in Mark Perlman and others, eds., Spatial, Regional and 
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through  the operation of automatic market forces alone, and collective 
goods as an important  component of the social-welfare  function. Those 
who take this view tend to base their  concern  with explicit  balance-of-pay- 
ments  policies in a fixed-rate  world  and their  frequent  preference  for man- 
aged  flexibility  on the need to insulate  the domestic  economy  from foreign 
disturbances  and to permit national governments  to pursue independent 
macro stabilization  policies, in a world of integrated  markets. Funda- 
mentally,  this view  regards  exchange-rate  policy  as one instrument  by which 
governments  may preserve  some independence  in the policy sphere  with a 
minimum  of disruption  to the benefits  of market  integration  in the private 
sphere.  But full-fledged  global  monetarism,  which  tends to regard  conven- 
tional stabilization  policies as both unnecessary  and ineffective,  is plagued 
by no such tradeoff  and is free to focus on a single criterion  for the ex- 
change-rate  regime:  one that will maximize  the efficiency  benefits  of world- 
wide integration  of commodity  and factor markets. 
Theoretical  Progress  and Policy Relevance:  A Scorecard 
Without doubt, the challenges  to postwar orthodoxy surveyed in this 
paper, and the responses  of the modern Keynesians  stimulated  by them, 
have engendered  rapid  progress  in the area of theoretical  specification  and 
model building.  The explicit  recognition  of the interactions  among  all mar- 
kets in a general-equilibrium  system;  the specification  of full equilibrium  in 
the market  for money (and other financial  assets) in stock as well as flow 
terms;  the recognition  that the response  of an economy  to a devaluation  is 
properly  analyzed  in a macroeconomic  rather  than a microeconomic  con- 
text; and the distinction  among impact effects, the dynamic adjustment 
process, and long-run  stationary-state  effects of a disturbance-these are 
only some of  the theoretical clarifications  and refinements  that have 
emerged  from  a dynamic  process  of challenge,  response,  and synthesis  over 
the past decade. 
IIn  terms  of policy relevance,  it is the monetary  approach  to the balance 
of payments-rather than the entire package here termed global mone- 
tarism-that has yielded fruitful  insights.  Its assertion  that, under  pegged 
exchange  rates, the national money supply should be regarded  as an en- 
dogenous rather  than a policy variable  appears  to hold almost fully for 
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of others,  and not at all for the United States,  the major  supplier  of interna- 
tional reserves  in recent  years.  Even so, the monetary  approach  has yielded 
useful implications  for the impact of domestic monetary policy in the 
United States on its own balance  of payments,  on the internal  economies 
of other  countries,  and on the viability  of the gold-exchange  standard  that 
characterized  the Bretton  Woods system. 
Similarly,  the flexible-rate  analogue  of the monetary  approach-the asset 
approach  to exchange-rate  analysis-has  proved extremely  valuable for 
understanding  and interpreting  the experiences  of recent  years. It has fo- 
cused attention on such factors as relative  money-market  conditions  and 
shifts  in portfolio  preferences  as important  determinants  of exchange  rates 
in the short and medium run, as opposed to the exclusive  focus on pur- 
chasing-power-parity  conditions  and the longer-run  structural  phenomena 
usual in Keynesian  analysis.  This asset-market  approach  provides  a useful 
framework  for consideration  of possible problems created by short-run 
"overshooting"  of longer-run  equilibria,  such as price "ratchets,"  bank- 
ruptcy thresholds created by capital-market  imperfections,  and related 
issues. 
Most of the more  revolutionary  policy  implications  emerge,  however,  not 
from the monetary  approach  or its flexible-rate  analogue,  but from  the full 
package of global-monetarist  assumptions.  And these, by and large, miss 
the boat for applicability  to current  problems.  In their  assumption  of per- 
fect substitutability  between  domestic  and foreign  goods and financial  as- 
sets, and of perfect arbitrage  across national boundaries in both com- 
modity and capital markets, for example,  the global monetarists  go too 
far  in correcting  an error  implicit  in much  of the earlier  Keynesian  analysis. 
Market integration  across national boundaries  has certainly  increased  in 
recent years but, quite apart from the remaining  barriers  to trade, con- 
siderable  evidence  suggests  that, at least for certain  classes  of commodities 
and financial  assets, domestic and foreign counterparts  are not regarded 
as perfect  substitutes,  creating  substantial  deviations  from  the "law of one 
price,"  at least in the short  run. More  broadly,  while  the global  monetarists 
perform  a service in insisting  that the international  repercussions  of do- 
mestic policies must be recognized  as more than second-order  qualifica- 
tions to a closed-economy  analysis,  they tend to dismiss  too lightly  the fact 
that  the nation-state  remains  the basic  economic  entity  in the modern  world 
and that policy independence  remains  an important  concern of national 
governments. 536  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
Finally, and most important,  by focusing  on the long-run  general-equi- 
librium  characteristics  of the economic  system-in  particular,  by assuming 
that real  output  is determined  exogenously  and that money  is neutral  vis-a- 
vis real  variables-global monetarism  consigns  to irrelevance  the problems 
of economic  stabilization  with which  most policymakers  are  primarily  con- 
cerned  and  to ineffectiveness  the traditional  macroeconomic  tools of mone- 
tary and fiscal policy. In another  context, Okun once concluded  that the 
monetarists  "have  provided  good questions  and bad answers."87  As I see 
it, the global  monetarists  have raised  some good questions  but have buried 
some even more important  ones. Specifically,  they insist, correctly,  on the 
importance  of recognizing  the long-run  implications  of policies  undertaken 
to achieve short- or medium-term  goals, but they are wont, wrongly, to 
ignore short- and medium-term  effects in focusing on the long-term  full- 
equilibrium  situation.  The questions  they thus skip over are important  not 
only because  of the short  time  horizon  of policymakers,  but also because  of 
differences  in social costs associated  with different  adjustment  processes 
and  varying  lengths  of the transition  period.  They  are  important,  even  more 
fundamentally,  because in the real world, long-run  equilibrium  is a state 
perhaps  approached  but never reached,  and, in a dynamic  rather  than a 
stationary  economy, the characteristics  of the adjustment  path, while the 
economy is out of equilibrium,  are bound to affect the characteristics  of 
the long-run  equilibrium  itself. 
As with  most challenges  to orthodoxy,  a winnowing  process  is now under 
way, and the most fruitful  component  of that challenge-the insights  of the 
monetary  approach  to payments  analysis-is  rapidly  being co-opted into 
the conventional  wisdom  itself. Beyond  that, global  monetarism  offers  little 
of policy relevance  at this time, and the practical  problem  remains:  "how 
to marry  the monetarist  and the Keynesian  analysis  in a way relevant  to 
the short-run  context  (albeit  a run of several  calendar  years)  with which  the 
policy-makers  are  concerned,  and which  is characterized  both by variations 
in production  and employment  as well as in money prices, and by varia- 
tions in the relations  among export, import and non-traded  goods prices 
which  are assumed  away  in the long-run  equilibrium  analysis  of the mone- 
tarist  approach."88 
87. "Fiscal-Monetary  Activism," p. 157. 
88. Johnson, Further  Essays in Monetary  Economics,  p. 14. Comments  and 
Discussion 
William H. Branson:  Marina Whitman's  paper surveys recent develop- 
ments in the monetary  and monetarist  approaches  to analysis of the bal- 
ance of payments. The survey is interesting  and evenhanded,  but as is 
appropriate  for a survey,  it offers  no new results.  Therefore,  I have nothing 
to attack  ruthlessly  (which  would be no fun anyway),  and I can offer only 
differences  of approach,  emphasis, and interpretation.  Whitman's  paper 
begins with global monetarism,  and then goes on to discuss other ap- 
proaches  (monetary,  Keynesian,  elasticities,  absorption,  any combination 
of the above) to understanding  the balance of payments  as extensions of 
global  monetarism.  My approach  is to treat  a generalized  IS-LM  model of 
short-run  equilibrium  with several  assets as the general  case, and then to 
look at the monetary  approach  and global  monetarism  as increasingly  spe- 
cial cases of this model. I think this improves  understanding,  and puts the 
various approaches  in proper  perspective.  (I am encouraged  to wander  in 
the no-man's-land  between the "monetarist"  and "Keynesian"  interna- 
tional schools  since  I am viewed  by some of my professional  colleagues  as a 
"die-hard  Keynesian"  and by others as a "closet  monetarist.") 
Before  getting  into a brief discussion  of the relationship  of the monetary 
approach  and global monetarism  to the standard  post-Keynesian  analysis 
of the balance  of payments,  I should  point out one aspect of the Whitman 
paper  that I would fault. Toward  the end of the paper,  Whitman  seems to 
criticize  the monetary  approach  for having  nothing  to say about  the compo- 
sition  of the balance  of payments.  While  this observation  is true,  the mone- 
tary  approach  makes  no claim  to addressing  this matter,  so I think  that this 
criticism is misplaced. 
Whitman focuses on global monetarism  and treats the more general 
monetary  approach  to analysis  of the balance  of payments  as an extension 
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of monetarism.  She then goes on to relate  the monetary  approach  to the 
traditional  Keynesian elasticities-absorption  literature  as further exten- 
sions.  I think  that understanding  of the roles of the monetary  and monetar- 
ist approaches  would be aided by reversing  the order of this discussion, 
treating  the monetary  approach  as a special case of the traditional  post- 
Keynesian  macro  framework,  and global  monetarism  as a polar case of the 
monetary  approach.  This ordering  places  global  monetarism  in proper  per- 
spective; Whitman's  paper contains many references  to scholarly work 
(published  in the journals,  rather  than in the popular  press) on the mone- 
tary approach,  and few on global monetarism. 
Beginning  with the standard  IS-LM model of income determination,  I 
want  to introduce,  in the interest  rate-income  space, a third  line that is the 
locus of points where  the balance  of payments  is zero. Call this the BP line; 
it is positively  sloped. If the IS-LM equilibrium  intersection  is above the 
BP line, the economy  is experiencing  a balance-of-payments  surplus;  below 
the BP line, a deficit  (all of this assuming  fixed exchange  rates).  A change 
in the exchange  rate  shifts  both the BP and IS curves  in this picture,  and  the 
elasticity  story is about the direction  and extent of these shifts, while the 
absorption  story is about the economy's  reactions  to them. 
The monetary  approach  simply  adds to this story  the observation  that if 
the effects  of a nonzero  balance  of payments  on the money supply  are not 
sterilized,  the momentary  IS-LM equilibrium  point cannot be a full equi- 
librium,  since  the money supply  is changing.  In the absence  of sterilization, 
a necessary  (but not sufficient)  condition  for full stock  equilibrium  would  be 
an IS-LM intersection  on the BP line, so that the money stock is constant 
while the money market  is in equilibrium.  It is worth noting that the role 
of the balance  of payments  in changing  the money stock in open-economy 
macroeconomics  is almost exactly analogous to the role of the "govern- 
ment-budget  constraint"  in a closed  economy.  The Blinder-Solow  results  in 
the closed economy  (cited by Whitman)  are exactly  the same as Mundell's 
famous  results  with fixed  exchange  rates.' 
The key assumption  in the monetary  approach,  which  could be a testable 
hypothesis,  is that monetary  authorities  do not or cannot sterilize  (or nul- 
1. See Robert A. Mundell, "Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed 
and Flexible Exchange  Rates," in Richard E. Caves and Harry G. Johnson, eds., Read- 
ings in International  Economics  (Irwin, 1968). For the comparison, see also William H. 
Branson,  "Flow and Stock Equilibrium  in a Traditional  Macro Model," Working  Paper 
G-74-02 (Princeton University, International  Finance Section, May 1974). Marina  v. N. Whitman  539 
lify, in Whitman's  term) the balance-of-payments  surplus over any sig- 
nificant  period.  This assumption  makes  the full stock-equilibrium  position 
the interesting  one for the monetary-approach  analyst,  and  his comparisons 
are usually  made between  such equilibria.  The evidence on whether  ster- 
ilization  is possible  is mixed. According  to the findings  cited by Whitman, 
some significant  persistent  sterilization  is possible. 
The principal  inference  usually drawn from the monetary  approach  is 
that between  stock equilibria,  changes  in exchange  rates alter the reserve 
level  by inducing  temporary  payments  imbalances,  but that in equilibrium, 
the balance  is zero. In the monetary  approach,  exchange-rate  policy is re- 
serve  policy, not balance-of-payments  policy. However,  the monetary  ap- 
proach also implies that changes in exchange rates can be effective in 
eliminating  balance-of-payments  disequilibria  caused by shifts in other 
variables-a  point that is underemphasized  in the Whitman  paper (and 
played down by most monetary-approach  writers).  If the balance of pay- 
ments is not in equilibrium  to begin with, changing the exchange rate 
could  be more  effective  than waiting  for the effects  of the disequilibrium  on 
the money stock to work  their  way through  the system.  This should be the 
relevant  inference  drawn  from  the monetary  approach;  after  all, changes  in 
exchange  rates under the Bretton Woods system were responses  to dis- 
equilibrium  situations. 
Global monetarism  narrows the monetary approach even further by 
adding "small country" assumptions-as  international  economists call 
them-and  wage flexibility  to the nonsterilization  assumption.  According 
to the small-country  assumptions,  the economy is a price taker facing a 
world  interest  rate  and price  level, and can buy or sell all it chooses at those 
prices.  These assumptions  fix the price level and the interest  rate. The as- 
sumption  of flexible  wages  fixes  output  and employment  at the full-employ- 
ment level. With all the determinants  of the demand  for money fixed, any 
change in the domestic base has to be offset by a one-for-one  change in 
foreign  reserves.  In the polar case of global monetarism,  the world  money 
stock drives  the price  level and national  monetary  policies  merely  allocate 
reserves. 
The evidence cited above overwhelmingly  confirms  that movements  in 
foreign-exchange  reserves  do not offset on a one-for-one  basis changes  in 
the domestic  base (or vice versa),  and it is clear  that most countries  experi- 
ence  fluctuations  in price  levels and interest  rates  relative  to world  averages, 
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case of global monetarism  may describe some long-run average, but it 
seems  hardly  relevant  for economic  policy. 
Whitman  discusses  asset-market  determination  of the exchange  rate, in 
the short  run, as the flexible-rate  dual to the monetary  approach  with fixed 
rates. Here the exchange rate is viewed as the relative price of national 
moneys, and as adjusting  in the short run so that the existing  stocks are 
willingly  held. In the monetary  approach,  with fixed rates the balance  be- 
tween  demand  for and supply  of money determines  the official-settlements 
balance;  with flexible  rates it determines  the exchange  rate. In both cases, 
the basic equilibrium  condition is an asset- or stock-market  equilibrium. 
In the short run, the exchange  rate is determined,  along with interest 
rates, in the asset-equilibrium  LM sector. This is a straightforward  exten- 
sion to the open economy of Tobin's general-equilibrium  approach to 
monetary  theory.  In a simple  case with two countries,  each with an imper- 
fectly substitutable  bond and a money, asset-market  equilibrium  condi- 
tions determine  values for two interest  rates and the exchange  rate.2  An 
immediate  implication  is that, in the short run, exchange  rates should ex- 
hibit the variability  of stock-market  prices.  This is an insight of the asset- 
market  approach  that was missed by most early advocates  of flexible ex- 
change  rates. 
In the asset-market  approach with flexible rates, the exchange rate is 
determined  in the short run by requirements  of asset-market  equilibrium. 
The exchange rate then influences  the current  account with a lag. Since 
rates  are flexible,  the capital-account  balance  is the negative  of the current 
account, so the current-account  balance also is the rate of change of net 
foreign-asset  holdings.  Thus,  the current-account  balance  feeds holdings  of 
net foreign  assets,  moving the exchange  rate. The system  works  as follows: 
Asset  (I\  Current  Capital 
stocks  \e/  account  account 
I 
Here r is the vector of interest  rates and e is the vector of exchange  rates. 
This system comes into full equilibrium  (stationary  or growing)  when all 
stocks reach equilibrium  values. The important  aspect of the current  ac- 
count here is its role as the foreign  net-worth  account; it gives the rate of 
2. For the analysis, see Lance Girton and Dale W. Henderson,  "Central  Bank Opera- 
tions in  Foreign and Domestic  Assets under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates" 
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net foreign  investment.3  The consistency  of this mechanism  with long-run 
purchasing-power  parity (PPP), can be illustrated  as follows. If from an 
initial equilibrium,  the home government  starts running  a budget deficit, 
increasing  the rate  of growth  of supply  of home-denominated  assets  (money 
or debt), the exchange  rate rises. This stimulates  net exports and aggre- 
gate demand, pulling up the price level. Eventually, the price increase 
brings  the system  back to PPP with a higher  exchange  rate.  The analogy  to 
the Tobin view of the relationship  between  equity prices and investment 
should  be obvious. 
The twist  that the monetary-approach  analysts  such  as Kouri and Mussa 
apply to this asset-equilibrium  approach  is to drop the securities  market, 
or capital account, from the story. This is done either by making small- 
country  assumptions  that fix home interest  rates, or by using a two-asset 
model so that the bond market  can be dropped.  The balance  of payments 
then becomes  a matter  of exchange  of money for goods, in which the ex- 
change rate is determined  only by the relative stocks (levels or growth 
rates)  of money.  In this special  case, the asset-market  view of exchange-rate 
determination  collapses  to simple consideration  of relative  money stocks, 
and money takes on a unique  role among assets. 
By discussing  models  without  bonds as the initial  case, Whitman's  paper 
leaves the impression  that the monetary approach  and the asset-market 
approach  are the same  thing,  except  for technical  details.  In fact, the mone- 
tary approach  is a special  case of the asset-market  approach,  and the gap 
between  the two is as wide  as the theoretical  distance  from  Yale to Chicago. 
The essential  simultaneity  of interest-rate  and exchange-rate  determination 
is clear in the Dornbusch  paper on flexible  exchange  rates cited by Whit- 
man (note 51). 
In the flexible-rate  case, the current-account  balance  is the rate of accu- 
mulation of net foreign assets by the private sector, and is part of the 
saving decision. This interpretation  is clear in the asset-market  view of 
exchange-rate  determination.  With  fixed  rates,  the current-account  balance 
is the national rate of accumulation  of net foreign  assets,  with the interven- 
tion policy of the central  bank determining  the public-private  split. Con- 
trolled  floating  probably  should be modeled in this manner. 
The important  insight  here is that the natural  separation  in the balance- 
3. Charles P. Kindleberger  emphasizes this role of the current-account  balance in 
"Measuring Equilibrium in the Balance of Payments," Journal of Political Economy, 
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of-payments  accounts  is between  the flow account-the  current  account- 
and the two stock accounts-the capital  account  and  the official-settlements 
balance.  The last two are in the LM or asset sector of a properly  specified 
model of an open economy, and the first is in the IS or flow sector. The 
interaction  over time is that the flows are the rates  of change  of the stocks. 
Thus, among all the balances, only the current-account  balance (give or 
take unilateral  transfers  and SDR allocations)  has an unambiguous  inter- 
pretation:  it is the rate of accumulation  of net foreign  assets. 
The monetary  approach  makes  the official-settlements  balance  the center 
of analysis only by lumping together  the capital account and current  ac- 
count, or by ignoring  the capital  account.  In doing so, it assumes  a unique- 
ness of money  in the spectrum  of assets  that is convenient  for pedagogy  and 
illuminating  for analysis,  but probably not realistic.  (Since private accu- 
mulation  of foreign  money  is a capital-account  term,  the official-settlements 
balance cannot technically  summarize  money transactions.)  Correct  inte- 
gration  of the external  accounts  into models of domestic  economies  prob- 
ably requires  separation  of the current  account, rather than the money 
account, from the rest. 
David  I. Fand: Marina  Whitman's  paper  provides  a comprehensive  view of 
the monetary  approach  to the balance  of payments.  She faces a very diffi- 
cult  problem  because  so many  writers  are  developing  this approach  and the 
literature  is expanding  very rapidly. She has worked  conscientiously  and, 
on the whole, successfully  to present  the main ideas. 
Identifying  the main  currents  in any approach  poses difficult  questions  of 
selection  and  judgment.  Whitman  views the content of global  monetarism, 
as she defines  it in this paper, as part of the mainstream  of the monetary 
approach.  Yet, two examples  suggest  that it may be one particular  adapta- 
tion of the monetary  approach  and that it may lie outside  the mainstream. 
First, most of the writers  favoring  the monetary  approach  also favor  flex- 
ible exchange  rates. This advocacy  is hard to square  with global monetar- 
ism as defined  by Whitman.  Second,  the law of one price,  as enunciated  by 
the global  monetarists,  implies  that somehow  the price  of haircuts  in India 
will be equated  to the price of haircuts  in the United States.  On the other 
hand,  many  writers  who follow the monetary  approach  limit the law of one 
price  to traded  goods so that it influences  payments  imbalances  or exchange 
rates, or both. 
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guish  between  the soft version  and the hard  version  (to borrow  terms  intro- 
duced  by Robert  Solow).  The soft version,  as I see it, advances  propositions 
that most people would accept. This version of the monetary approach 
(following Dornbusch's  recent discussion  in the American  Economic  Re- 
view,  vol. 65, May 1975, pp. 147-48) first emphasizes  that the balance of 
payments  and  the balance  of trade  basically  involve  questions  of macroeco- 
nomics and monetary-fiscal  policy. Any approach  that does not put the 
problem  in a macroeconomic  setting  is incomplete,  if not misleading.  While 
all would accept this view, in some discussions  it tends to be overlooked. 
A viewing of the balance of payments  in a macroeconomic  setting  casts 
doubt on the validity  of the J curve-the  idea that devaluation  worsens  the 
trade  balance  in the short run. No macroeconomic  relation  would predict 
an increase  in spending  relative  to income as a result of a change in ex- 
change  rates independently  of monetary  and fiscal policy. 
Another issue is the alleged  permanent  relative  price advantage  for ex- 
ports following  a devaluation.  The assumption  that a change  in exchange 
rates exerts permanent  real effects implies some kind of money illusion. 
Under some monetary  and fiscal  policies,  it will have long-run  real effects, 
but then it is the monetary-fiscal  setting and the change between  income 
and expenditure  that are essential.  The exchange  rate is only a helpful  way 
of altering  the relative  prices of domestic  goods and traded  goods. 
A change  in exchange  rates  accompanied  by a validating  macroeconomic 
policy will have effects on the  competitive position of  a  country in 
world  markets.  These  effects  arise  not because  exports  become  cheaper  and 
imports  more expensive,  but rather  because  the relation  between  domestic 
and traded  goods is altered.  The improvement  for the domestic  producers 
of traded  goods derives  from the lower real costs in their sector. 
The enhanced  competitive  position of the home country  extends  beyond 
the established  traded  goods. The  reduced  domestic  absorption  causes  some 
goods to move from the domestic-goods  sector  to the traded-goods  sector, 
as the decline in their relative  prices makes them competitive  even given 
tariffs  and transportation  costs. 
The monetary  approach  to the balance of payments  does not require  a 
small-country  assumption,  nor does it assume any particular  or unusual 
relations  for the prices of internally  traded  goods. What it does assume  is 
that the prices  for identical  traded  goods, with allowance  for tariffs,  trans- 
portation costs, and so on, are equalized  between countries. Otherwise, 
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Exchange  rates are determined  in the market  for assets and not in the 
market  for flows of foreign  exchange.  This concept  is far  removed  from  the 
view of the exchange  rate  as a means  of balancing  a current  account  with an 
independently  specified  capital  account.  It also lends substantial  scope for 
expectations  in the determination  of the exchange  rate. The erratic  move- 
ments in exchange  rates in the last two years are not all that surprising, 
considering  the kinds of stock adjustments  that were  involved. 
In general,  in the soft version, anything  that affects  the demand  for or 
supply of money will, as a first approximation,  be reflected  by changes  in 
the exchange  rate. Finally,  the attractiveness  of flexible  rates  for monetary 
policy may not be as great as previously  believed. Flexible rates allow a 
country to choose its own rate of inflation, but they do not insulate a 
country  against  real disturbances  originating  abroad. 
A hard version of the monetary  approach  to the balance of payments 
first  emphasizes  that all payments  imbalances  and disequilibria  are mone- 
tary in essence.  Structural  deficits  or surpluses  do not exist, unless one in- 
cludes  in the concept  of structure  a propensity  to rely  on inflationary  financ- 
ing. Any assertion  that real changes  cause  payments  deficits  or surpluses  is 
correct  only if the real  change  is assumed  to result  in policies  that run  down 
international  reserves  as an alternative  to reducing  real absorption  or bor- 
rowing on commercial  terms.4 
Disequilibria  in the balance of payments  must be transitory,  and their 
duration  will be relatively  short, unless they are continually  renewed  by 
noncommercial  transfers  of money. A country may support a deficit by 
replacing  international  reserves  with domestic  credit,  but it will eventually 
run  out of reserves.  Similarly,  a country  may be able  to "sterilize"  its acqui- 
sition of international  reserves,  but eventually  it will exhaust  its stock of 
domestic  credit assets. It can continue to sterilize  reserve  inflows only by 
lending  the money back to foreign  countries  in noncommercial  ways. 
All payments  disequilibria  can be handled  by the use of domestic  mone- 
tary policy without  resorting  to changes  in exchange  rates. We should ex- 
clude a disaster  like the 1930s, when all currencies  were overvalued in 
terms of the international  reserve  asset; in this case the solution should 
have been an all-around  increase  in the domestic  prices  of the reserve  asset 
without any change  in the relative  values of national  currencies. 
4.  See Harry G. Johnson, "The Monetary  Approach to Balance of Payments  Theory 
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Devaluation  is a substitute  for domestic  credit  contraction,  operating  to 
reduce  the world  value of the country's  money supply;  and appreciation  is 
a substitute  for domestic  credit  expansion,  operating  to increase  the world 
value  of a country's  money supply.  The argument  for either  devaluation  or 
appreciation  rests on its use as a means of avoiding the equivalent  con- 
traction  or expansion  in the domestic  money supply,  and thus on price  and 
wage rigidity  or money illusion. A change in exchange  rates can be ren- 
dered ineffective by an inappropriate,  counteracting,  monetary policy. 
Also, a devaluation  (revaluation)  will have to be repeated, unless it is 
accompanied  by a slower  (faster)  rate of domestic  credit  expansion. 
Import  quotas,  tariffs,  exchange  controls,  and other  restrictions  on trade 
and payments  will improve  the balance  of payments  if they induce an in- 
crease in the demand for money. Like those of a devaluation,  any such 
effects  will be purely  transitory,  lasting only until the supply of money is 
increased  through  payments  surpluses  to meet the larger  demand.  But if the 
controls  are accompanied  by domestic  credit  expansion,  designed  to facili- 
tate adjustment  to the restrictions  and the accompanying  rise in prices,  the 
balance  of payments  will not be improved  and may be worsened. 
A faster  rate of economic growth  will tend to improve  a country's  bal- 
ance of payments  by increasing  the demand  for money. This potential  im- 
provement  will be realized  only if the accelerated  economic growth  is not 
accompanied  by accelerated  expansion  of domestic  credit. 
In brief summary,  what is the connection,  if any, among global mone- 
tarism,  the monetary  approach,  and monetarism?  The hard version of the 
monetary  approach  emphasizes  the stability  in the demand  for money and 
attributes  many of the disturbances  to government  activity,  especially  with 
respect  to the variations  in the supply of money. Moreover,  the view that 
payments  disturbances  emanate  from the monetary  side, and not from the 
trade or capital side, is consistent  with the view that the private sector is 
stable relative  to the government.  The hard version of the monetary  ap- 
proach  does share  some of the assumptions  of monetarism,  in contrast  to 
the soft version, which takes a more eclectic view. As already  noted, the 
global monetarists,  who favor fixed rates, differ  from most other writers 
who follow the monetary  approach.  Finally, the global monetarists  who 
view the nominal  money stock as determined  by the balance of payments, 
and thus beyond the reach of the monetary  authorities,  clearly  differ  from 
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Lawrence  B. Krause:  Marina  Whitman  offers  us a classic  paper, much as 
Anne Krueger's  paper  was classic,  in focusing  attention  on very important 
developments  in theory. The paper does help clarify  the issues. 
I shall  concentrate  on the area  of my own comparative  advantage,  which 
lies in evaluating  the usefulness  of theory for policy analysis.  To do so, I 
shall look more closely at global monetarism  than at the monetary ap- 
proach. The global monetarist  has a clear policy prescription:  fix the ex- 
change  rate and rely on automatic  stabilizers  for balance-of-payments  ad- 
justments. In general,  Whitman  has bent over backwards  to give credit, 
not only to the monetary  approach,  but also to the global  monetarists,  and 
I think she occasionally  lost her equilibrium  in the bending.  She properly 
distinguishes  between  the two. But I think one cannot really  give credit  to 
either  for recognizing  the balance  of payments  as a monetary  phenomenon, 
unless  Fritz  Machlup,  who has always  written  in that vein, is designated  as 
a monetarist  pioneer. 
It is true  that the older  Keynesian  tradition  of balance-of-payments  anal- 
ysis with its elasticity  approach,  working  from the top down rather  than 
the bottom up, often ran out of steam when it got to short-term  capital 
movements.  Indeed,  that criticism  of the projections  of the U.S. balance  of 
payments  made by Salant and his associates  a decade ago was offered  at 
the time by Harry  Johnson  and was the most valid criticism  of that study. 
The trouble  with the earlier  approach  is that it offered  no way to integrate 
money markets,  security  markets,  and goods markets-not a critical  over- 
sight in the case of real disturbances,  but a serious weakness  if the dis- 
turbances  of the system are on the monetary side, as they have often 
turned  out to be. 
When I inspect the substance  of global monetarism  as an alternative 
approach,  I find it totally an analysis  of fixed exchange  rates, and I think 
Whitman's  exposition should make that clearer.  When it is applied to a 
system  of flexible  exchange  rates  and to the way an exchange  rate is deter- 
mined, global monetarism  tells me merely  that the price of a currency  is 
affected  by supply and demand.  I cannot give it much credit for that, be- 
cause I learned  that a long time ago. Perhaps  it helps a little by telling  me 
to look at assets properly  as part of demand  and supply. 
Whether  one learns  something  by going through  the asset approach  de- 
pends on the realism  of the assumptions.  Let me focus particularly  on that 
regarding  sterilization  by central  banks. I am amused  to note that Robert 
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that  they had turned  the automatic  adjustment  mechanism  into an anach- 
ronism. He even called the article "The International Disequilibrium 
System."5 
The system  may have changed  some since 1961,  but not all that much. 
The truth is that central banks sterilize to some extent and they don't 
sterilize  to some extent. For instance,  in 1971,  when Japan  had a gigantic 
inflow of foreign reserves,  everybody said they had lost control of their 
money  supply.  More recent  analyses  of that experience  show that that was 
not true  at all. The Japanese,  in fact, sterilized  a major  share  of that inflow; 
that they didn't  do so during  a subsequent  episode  can only mean that they 
did not want to. In other words,  they were  not the pawns of the inflow of 
foreign  money: they were following  the monetary  policy that they wanted. 
The assumption  furthest  from  reality  is that the short  run  can be ignored. 
The concentration  on the long run assumes  away all of the problems  that 
make  the balance  of payments  a problem.  It is about the short  run and the 
dynamics  of the adjustment  process  that most governments  worry  most of 
the time. In that context, I would like to nominate one sentence  in this 
paper  for the understatement  of the month: "In  a world  where  the stabiliza- 
tion of income  and  employment  at high  levels  (or along  a reasonable  growth 
path) is a primary  concern  of policymakers,  an analytical  model that elimi- 
nates these concerns  by assumption  operates  under  a certain  handicap." 
On the question  of goods arbitrage,  even when  the assumption  is limited 
to traded goods, it is still really not correct and may not pick up some 
essential aspects of behavior. In considering  the prices of consumption 
goods that are traded, the price of meat, for example, relative to other 
goods is shockingly  different  in Australia,  the United States, and Japan. 
Yet meat clearly is a traded good, and the behavior of its prices raises 
questions  about  the general  usefulness  of the law of one price  as an assump- 
tion even for traded  goods. 
I am particularly  concerned  about the monetary approach because it 
may distract  attention  from important  issues. Let me illustrate:  I recently 
heard a paper presented  on the Mexican  balance of payments.  The work 
was done in a global-monetarist  framework  and empirically  verified  that 
approach.  Of course,  Mexico is a small  country  with  the United States  next 
to it, a fixed exchange  rate, and a monetary  base that reflects  its reserves. 
But why does the balance  of payments  matter  to Mexico?  Is their debt to 
5. Kyklos, vol.  14 (fasc. 2,  1961), pp.  153-72 (adaptation appears in Robert A. 
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the world  rising  or are they becoming  a creditor?  Are the short-run  and the 
long-run  capital  flows sustainable  within  the Mexican  position?  The theory 
may "work"  and still be destructive  because  it buries  these issues. 
My own preference  is for an eclectic  approach  that begins  with absorp- 
tion, but that allows other  things  to be added,  depending  on the sources  of 
the disequilibrium.  Let me say finally that I object to economic theories 
that depart  from the reality  of political economy. Nationalism  cannot be 
ignored,  particularly  when it is on the rise, as I think it is. Leaving  out the 
hegemonic  power that has always  existed  under  systems  of fixed exchange 
rates constitutes  blindness  to the reality  of political economy. 
Walter  S. Salant: I am in general  agreement  with the conclusions  of Ma- 
rina  Whitman's  paper  and strongly  endorse  most of them.  But  I have  prob- 
lems with some points she makes on the way to her conclusions. 
To avoid any possible confusion,  let me make clear at the outset that I 
understand  the paper  to use the term "global  monetarism"  to refer  only to 
the view that all real variables  are determined  by real supply and demand 
functions,  that monetary  matters are separate  and don't affect those real 
demand  and supply functions,  and hence that changes in exchange  rates 
from one fixed rate to another  affect only the price level and not the net 
current-account  balance,  expressed  in foreign  currency.  That is a short de- 
scription  of an extreme  view held by a small  subset  of the large  set of those 
who approach  balance-of-payments  problems  from a monetary  point of 
view; it includes  Robert  Mundell  and Arthur  Laffer  and, so far as I know, 
few, if any, others. 
Whitman  displays  a generosity  toward  that extreme  position that seems 
to me excessive.  Her generosity  is reinforced  by her acceptance  of a few 
theoretical  points that I consider  incorrect  and by her crediting  that view 
with valid points that are common  to all approaches.  On policy matters,  I 
think she comes out with a properly  negative conclusion,  but her tone is 
kinder  than the view deserves. 
As to theoretical  points, my first comment  concerns  international  price 
arbitrage,  or the so-called  law of one price.  That  law says  that prices  of per- 
fectly  competitive,  internationally  traded  commodities  cannot  differ  in dif- 
ferent  national  markets  by more than the cost of transport  and the level of 
tariff barriers  in the importing  country (or the equivalent,  for nontariff 
barriers).  This rudimentary  proposition  in the theory  of international  trade 
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this and quite correctly  attributes  to global monetarists  only an extension 
of it to price levels.  I might note that the law of one price must apply, in 
fact, to all undifferentiated  commodities,  whether  traded  or not; prices of 
nontraded  goods also cannot  differ  by more  than  the costs imposed  by these 
transport  and trade  barriers  and are not traded  because  these costs are too 
high.  But  under  reasonable  realistic  assumptions,  changes  in exchange  rates 
shift goods between  traded  and nontraded  categories.  For all commodities 
there is an export point and an import point, analogous to the old gold 
points; hence, commodities  may shift from being imported  to being not 
traded  to being exported  and vice versa, even when the law of one price 
prevails.  (All of this was pointed out by Frank Graham  in the American 
Economic Review in 1925.6)  That makes awkward an analysis that is cast in 
terms  of a world  in which output  is rigidly  separated  into traded  and non- 
traded  categories. 
Moreover,  even if all markets  were  perfectly  competitive  so that the law 
of one price held for all products,  a change  in exchange  rates could affect 
trade balances.  A change in the relative  price of the same commodity  in 
two or more national  markets  is not necessary  to obtain that effect. As I 
pointed out when this same issue came up in the discussion of William 
Branson's  paper for BPEA, 1:1972, the relationship  of the foreign  to the 
domestic  price does not have to change  to induce substitutions  of produc- 
tion, for such substitutions  result  not only from differences  in prices  in the 
two markets  but from  changes  in the relationship  of price  to cost within  an 
individual country. For  example, when a  country that exports small 
amounts  of wheat devalues,  the price of its wheat in foreign currencies  is 
unchanged,  but its wheat production  becomes more profitable  relative  to 
its production  of nontraded  commodities,  and more is exported.  To avoid 
such effects  on trade, it would be necessary  for changes  in exchange  rates 
to leave unaltered  not only the relation between product prices among 
countries  but the relation among factor prices both among  countries  and 
within  them. Such invariance  cannot be deduced  from international  arbi- 
trage alone for any period with which exchange-rate  policy is concerned. 
Thus, the law of one price arising  from commodity  arbitrage  does not 
rule  out effects  of devaluation  on trade.  On this point, Whitman  cites  Jacob 
Frenkel  as saying  that the law is irrelevant  to the refutation  of the simpli- 
fied  Keynesian  conclusions,  but she does not seem  to support  his position. 
6. Frank D.  Graham, "Germany's Capacity to  Pay and the Reparation Plan," 
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I think she should. Only in an imperfectly  competitive  world market in 
which the demand  for a country's  exports  is not infinitely  elastic does an 
increase  in exports  require  a cut in the price  measured  in foreign  currency. 
In short,  the assumptions  about price arbitrage  and changes  in terms  of 
trade, besides not being unique to the monetarists,  are not necessary  for 
their  conclusions  or for refutation  of the conclusions  of others. 
On a second  point of theory,  I think the paper  is excessively  generous  to 
global monetarism-and, indeed,  to the monetary  approach-in crediting 
them with the recognition  that the partial-equilibrium  assumptions  under- 
lying the elasticities  approach  are not adequate  to deal with the analysis  of 
changes  in exchange  rates. That has been recognized  at least since Sidney 
Alexander's  1952  article  expounding  the absorption  approach  to the effects 
of devaluations. 
The third generosity  concerns  a small point: Whitman  does imply that 
global  monetarism  made it obvious  to all that exchange  rates  represent  the 
relative  prices of national moneys. I cannot imagine that anybody ever 
thought  they represented  anything  else. 
The fourth  instance  of generosity  is in crediting  the monetarists  with the 
conclusion  that rules about intervention  in the exchange  market are not 
enough  to prevent  inconsistent  policies.  Of course,  rules  about  intervention 
can only prevent  inconsistent  intervention  policies.  That  other  policies,  such 
as monetary policy, affect the foreign-exchange  market has long been 
recognized. 
On policy matters,  the paper  is also unduly  generous  in dealing  with the 
global-monetarist  view that changes  in the exchange  rate affect the price 
level but not the current-account  balance.  This view has no revolutionary 
implications  for policy. It is confined  to the long-run  effects  of changes  in 
exchange  rates  that are  made from an initial  position of equilibrium.  It has 
little application  to balance-of-payments  problems  as they arise  in the real 
world.  It appears  revolutionary  only because  the proponents  of the global- 
monetarist  view do not make clear  that this is only a long-term  effect,  and 
applies  only to a devaluation  made from a position of equilibrium.  If one 
accepts their assumptions  that all relative prices are determined  by real 
demand  and supply functions  and that these functions  are not affected  by 
monetary  changes, the conclusions that they reach seem quite justified. 
Then,  a change  in exchange  rates  will not alter  the current-account  balance. 
But those assumptions,  if applied to periods no longer than a few years, 
also imply that the exchange  rate could never have gotten out of equilib- 
rium  in the first  place. Why, then, would a devaluation  occur? Marina  v. N.  Whitman  551 
Ultimately,  Whitman  raised  this question  but she waited  very  long to do 
so, and until  she did so she took the analysis  too seriously  as a contribution 
to exchange-rate  policy. The conclusion  that the global monetarists  reach 
about the effects  on the current-account  balance  of changing  an exchange 
rate  would  be valid as a forecast  of what  would  happen,  perhaps,  if a coun- 
try devalued  from equilibrium  in order  to perform  a scientific  experiment. 
Although  the model that leads to those conclusions  is helpful in focusing 
attention on some aspects of changes in exchange rates that were pre- 
viously neglected,  the things  that it excludes  and must exclude  in order  to 
reach its extreme  conclusions  make it positively  misleading  as a guide to 
policy. Therefore,  the application  of that solution to a serious  policy issue 
deserves  more severe  criticism  than Whitman  gave it. 
When  it is recognized  that devaluations  occur  from  positions of disequi- 
librium,  one interesting  question  that arises  is whether  and under  what  con- 
ditions the predevaluation  disequilibrium  will tend to be reestablished. 
That is a question  that really  is relevant  to policy, but it is ignored  by the 
global monetarists  and in the paper. I suggest  that, when the cause of the 
disequilibrium  is in some sense monetary,  a devaluation  can cure it, pro- 
vided that monetary  policy does not counteract  the effects  of the devalua- 
tion. But if the cause is real and there is no money illusion, devaluation 
will not cure it. For example,  if the balance of payments  is in deficit  be- 
cause the groups in the economy insist on maintaining  or restoring  real 
absorption  (consumption  plus investment)  that exceeds  the total national 
product  plus the maximum  possible capital  import, the deficit  in the total 
balance  of payments  cannot be cured  by a devaluation  because  the excess 
absorption  will persist  or recur. 
In general, I think the useful and stimulating  recent contributions  to 
balance-of-payments  theory  and policy have come from the monetary  ap- 
proach  to the balance  of payments,  not from global monetarism. 
General  Discussion 
In general,  the participants  felt that Marina Whitman  had illuminated 
some important  controversies  in international  economic analysis; hence, 
most of them offered  views or evidence  on some of the unresolved  issues, 
rather  than specific  criticisms  of the paper. 
Hendrik  Houthakker  focused  on purchasing-power  parity,  commenting 
that, although  in some quarters  it had been regarded  as an absurdity  just a 
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In his judgment,  purchasing-power  parity  was neither  absurdity  nor iden- 
tity but something  in between;  just where  it lay on that spectrum  was an 
important  topic for research.  Houthakker  saw it as a useful indicator  of 
exchange  rates  for the long run and, when  the discrepancy  is very  large,  for 
the medium  term as well. But he doubted  that, when the discrepancy  was, 
say, 10  percent,  it told very  much  about the likely  course  of exchange  rates, 
given the imperfections  of markets.  He shared  Lawrence  Krause's  puzzle- 
ment about prices of meat and other traded goods that apparently  don't 
equalize.  In response  to a suggestion  from Whitman,  he expressed  doubts 
that these cases could be fully explained  by the different  distribution  sys- 
tems among countries  that may apply differing  markups  to the wholesale 
prices of traded  goods. 
William Fellner  remarked  that, in popular discussion of the issues ex- 
amined  in the paper,  a key question  is whether,  under  a flexible-rate  regime, 
a country  has control of its domestic  price  level. He felt that two proposi- 
tions that are often confused  needed  to be distinguished  clearly.  On the one 
hand, if a country  is in its preferred  position with respect  to demand  man- 
agement  and price-level  movements,  it can insulate itself from price-level 
increases  that originate abroad. In a regime of flexible rates, such dis- 
turbances  will be neutralized.  On the other hand, when a country  acts to 
alter its demand  position-say,  increases  its level of employment  through 
expansionary  stabilization  policies-the  income expansion tends to raise 
its imports,  and thus to lower  the value of its currency  and raise  the domes- 
tic prices  of foreign  goods. Hence,  the price-level  consequences  of demand- 
management  policies  are influenced  by the flexibility  of exchange  rates  in a 
way that cannot readily be neutralized.  Robert Solomon suggested,  and 
Fellner  agreed,  that, in Fellner's  example,  the need for expansionary  poli- 
cies implied  some prior recession  or weakness  in demand,  which presum- 
ably must have exerted downward  influence  on domestic prices through 
flexible  exchange  rates. 
In Richard  Cooper's opinion, the literature  reviewed  by Whitman  had 
exerted  one important  constructive  influence.  It had helped economists  to 
recognize  that in the short run exchange rates may be determined  sub- 
stantially,  even primarily,  by stock equilibrium  in asset  markets  rather  than 
by the current  account.  While this idea is not new, Cooper  noted, the new 
emphasis  on it had greatly  influenced  professional  discussions  of exchange- 
rate issues. Until recently,  the relationship  between the exchange  rate and 
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tions, in a regime  of flexible  rates,  traded  goods and services  really  establish 
a long-run  supply price for a currency,  while the floating exchange rate 
clears  the asset  market  in the short  run, thereby  triggering  quantity  adjust- 
ments in the current  account that restore  long-term  asset equilibrium.  In 
such a system,  the exchange  rate will overshoot  its long-run  equilibrium  in 
response  to many  (though  not all) disturbances.  That overshooting  can im- 
pose important  social costs in the presence of market imperfections  or 
discontinuities,  such as dependence  on internal  financing,  bankruptcy,  or 
asymmetrical  responses  of domestic prices to appreciation  and deprecia- 
tion. These, in turn,  make the volatility  of exchange  rates  a proper  concern 
of public policy. 
Furthermore,  Cooper explained,  because  asset markets  are regarded  as 
important,  so are  speculation  and the formation  of expectations.  He judged 
that private  speculative  movements  during  recent  years  had smoothed  the 
Canadian  dollar quite well, but the Deutsche  mark inadequately,  vis-'a-vis 
the U.S. dollar.  Those divergent  experiences  raise  questions  about the po- 
tential contribution  of official  intervention  in smoothing exchange  rates. 
Thus, the key issues are: what is the optimum  degree  of flexibility  for ex- 
change  rates, and what role should government  intervention  play in pur- 
suing that optimum? 
Branson  elaborated  on Cooper's  discussion  of the asset determination  of 
exchange  rates,  pointing  to policy proposals  for splitting  currency  markets 
so that exchange  rates applying to current-account  transactions  could be 
controlled  while those for capital movements  would be free. Such policy 
measures  might insulate  the real sector,  in part, from  fluctuations  originat- 
ing in asset markets.  Cooper  noted that such proposals  assumed  that arbi- 
trage between  the two markets  could be prevented;  both he and Krause 
inferred  from the scattered  available  evidence  that the ability  to split those 
markets  was sharply  limited.  Rudiger  Dornbusch  pointed  out that the kind 
of overshooting  described  by Cooper would occur even if speculation  was 
fully consistent  with rational  expectations.  Further,  if such an event was 
experienced,  he cautioned, central-bank  intervention  to correct it might 
conflict  with the objectives  of domestic  stabilization  policy. 
Max Corden inspected  the proposition that the exchange  rate has no 
real effects, concluding  that its validity depends on assumptions  that the 
Phillips  curve  is vertical,  and that no rigidities  exist in the money  prices  for 
factors  or goods. Hence, that view is likely to appeal to the same people 
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nomena.  In short, Corden  felt, anyone  who believes  that fiscal  policy does 
not affect  employment  and output is likely to accept the hard-line  global- 
monetarist  view that variations  in exchange  rates  also have no real effects. 
In Dornbusch's  view, no one could seriously  doubt the presence  of real 
effects  of the exchange  rate in the short run; the important  questions  con- 
cern their duration and the channels through which they disappear.  In 
addition, Dornbusch disagreed with Krause's comment that the top- 
down approach  to the balance  of payments  is appropriate  for the analysis 
of the consequences  of real disturbances.  He stressed  that even real dis- 
turbances  influence  interest  rates  in general  and equity  prices  in relation  to 
capital-goods  prices  (Tobin's  q) in particular;  these  effects  require  a general- 
equilibrium  analysis that encompasses both the financial and the real 
sectors. 
Arthur  Okun  probed  into the sterilization  issue. As he saw it, the condi- 
tions under which a central bank could not control its domestic money 
supply in the face of foreign  inflows  (or outflows)  were ones in which for- 
eign near-moneys  are perfect  substitutes  for near-moneys  denominated  in 
the domestic currency.  But, in that situation, he insisted, foreign money 
would  be a virtually  perfect  substitute  for domestic  money,  most obviously 
as a cash balance  for financial  transactions.  Income velocity, measured  in 
terms of the domestic  money stock, would then be highly unstable.  Thus, 
the assumptions  about asset demands  that preclude  control over the do- 
mestic money stock also mean that such control doesn't matter. The as- 
sumptions of the global monetarist  are inconsistent  with the traditional 
monetarist  tenet that the demand function for domestic  money is stable. 
Branson's  formulation  of the international  monetary  issues  in an IS-LM 
framework  evoked favorable  comment, but also a few criticisms.  Fellner 
stressed  that, if a country  could not, in fact, control  its money  stock, as the 
global  monetarists  insisted,  the position  of the LM curve  could not be man- 
aged by the central bank, and hence the analogy to the Blinder-Solow 
formulation  of fiscal  policy  broke  down.  Dornbusch  questioned  the validity 
of the aggregation  of foreign  and domestic  demands  for goods implicit in 
the construction  of an IS curve. 
Marina  Whitman  responded  to a few of the issues  raised  during  both the 
formal  and the general  discussion.  She was amused  that she was most fre- 
quently  criticized  for excessive  kindness  and generosity.  She did not rebut 
that criticism-perhaps out of kindness  and generosity.  She agreed with 
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noting that the global monetarists  ignored it by focusing on a long-run 
equilibrium  in which  prices  must  equal  costs. Responding  to Corden's  com- 
ment, she agreed  that anyone who saw real income as exogenously  deter- 
mined in general,  would see no real effects from exchange  rates. But, she 
insisted,  one could believe  that real  income  was affected  by domestic  aggre- 
gate demand and yet not by the exchange rate, insofar as the domestic 
price  level might  respond  rapidly  to changes  in the exchange  rate but more 
slowly to shifts in aggregate  demand. 